A FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

By the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
BY THE CENTRE FOR FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

Authors: Nina Bernarding and Kristina Lunz

with support in the editorial and research process by

Marissa Conway and Damjan Denkovski.

June 2020

The research was funded by The Greens/EFA.
I Introduction

p.11 1. Purpose of the Study
p.11 2. Timing of the Study
p.13 3. Limitations of the Study
p.13 3.1 Lacking Consultations
p.13 3.2 Definition of Foreign and Security Policy
p.14 3.3 The Gendered Discourse on Foreign Policy

II The Status Quo of Feminist Foreign Policy

p.17 1. Feminist Foreign Policy in the World
p.17 1.1 The Prevalence of Feminist Foreign Policies
p.18 1.1.1 Sweden
p.20 1.1.2 Canada
p.21 1.1.3 France
p.22 1.1.4 Mexico
p.23 1.1.5 Criticism towards existing Feminist Foreign Policies
p.24 1.2 Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework
p.24 1.3 State of the Art Research: Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy
p.26 2. Feminist Foreign Policy within the EU External Action
p.27 2.1 A Flawed Understanding of Gender and Gender Equality
p.27 2.1.1 A Limited Understanding of Gender
p.29 2.1.2 Equality for the Sake of Efficiency
p.30 2.2 The Consequences: Flawed and Inconsistent Policies
p.31 2.2.1 Gender-blind policies
p.33 2.2.2. Lacking Policy Coherence and Flawed Understanding of Security

III Moving Forward: A Feminist Foreign Policy for the EU

p.39 1. Purpose of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.40 1.1 Priorities of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.40 1.2 Principles of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.41 2. Definition of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.42 3. Reach of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy
p.42 3.1 Adapt and institutionalise an inclusive and comprehensive definition of gender
3.2. Reverse the militarisation of EU external action and prioritise human security

3.3. Actively pursue intersectional gender equality as a guiding principle of the EU external action

3.4 Enhance Cooperation with and support to feminist civil society

3.5 Show political leadership towards implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy, enhance institutional capacities to do so, and ensure institution-wide gender parity

4. Intended Outcomes and Benchmarks to Achieve over Time

5. Plan to Operationalise

IV Conclusion

V Annex

Annex 1: Measures of Success
Annex 2: External and Outcome Measures including respective Accountability Measures

VI Bibliography

IV Experts Interviewed
List of Abbreviations
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFFP: Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
EBA: Expert Group on Aid Studies
EEAS: European External Action Service
ENAAAT: European Network against Arms Trade
EPF: European Peace Facility
EPLO: European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
ESS: European Security Strategy
EU: European Union
EUSR: European Union Special Representative
FIAP: Feminist International Assistance Policy
FFP: Feminist Foreign Policy
GBA+: Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+)
HR/VP: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IcSP: Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICRW: International Center for Research on Women
LGBTQI+: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Queer, Intersex
NAP: National Action Plan (for the Implementation for the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security)
NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NDCI: Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation
SIDA: Sweden's International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TPNW: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
SRE: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico)
UN: United Nations
UNCTED: United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
WILPF: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WIIS: Women In International Security
WPS: ‘Women, Peace and Security’ Agenda
When women sit at the negotiation table, peace deals last longer. When all people of all colour and LGBTQI+ are represented, policies become more inclusive and responsive to the needs of increasingly diverse societies.

The EU has recognised these principles in rhetoric but not in practice. The EU has had an external Gender Action Plan since 2010 – yet, clear gender equality goals and indicators on the relevant EU policies are entirely missing in the upcoming proposal of the Multiannual Financial Framework. This prevents the monitoring of the expenditure dedicated to gender equality in any policy area.

What is more, since 2009, the EU has a task force on Women Peace and Security – yet, men still lead 12 out of 12 Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Since 2018, the EEAS has a Gender Equal Opportunities Strategy – but again, the three newly appointed political directors are all men.

While the strategies exist, in practice, their application is limited. If we continue down the same path, full gender equality in the EU’s external action will not be a reality anytime soon.

Gender equality is at the core of the Greens policy agenda. While we welcome gender equality being prominently featured in the foreign policy strategies of Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg, and the other Member States, being spearheaded by Sweden, we want to make this an EU-wide reality.

We commissioned this study, conducted and written by the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP), to bring gender equality in foreign policy to the top of the EU agenda. It aims to set the foundation for an EU feminist foreign policy, which transforms the patriarchal structures embedded in foreign policy and security.

This study calls for the mandatory representation of women in foreign policy and recommends increases in financial and human resources to make this possible. It calls for addressing and understanding the experiences of ethnic and sexual minorities and breaking down the male-dominated hierarchy in foreign policy arenas. We embrace these recommendations and hope that this study will contribute to tear down prejudices embedded in the EU’s external action policies.

We are encouraged by the impressive work of civil society groups in this area. We await the ambitious Gender Action Plan that the European Commission is due to publish during the second half of 2020.

This year we also commemorate the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security. We hope this milestone will enhance and quicken our efforts to push for a feminist foreign policy worldwide.

Hannah Neumann

Ernest Urtasun
Part 1

Introduction
Introduction

1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to mark the beginning of a discussion on a Feminist Foreign Policy of the European Union (EU). It will outline the window of opportunity for the EU to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy (Part I), provide an overview of the status quo of Feminist Foreign Policies in the world (Part II), and analyse the dominant narratives around gender, gender equality and existing initiatives aimed at promoting gender equality within EU external action. Finally, the study will propose a definition of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, outline its purpose and underlying principles, and suggest concrete priorities and steps aimed at advancing a feminist approach to EU external action (Part III). The authors of the study are fully cognizant of the limitations of the study: a 50-page study cannot do justice to the fundamental transformation of foreign policy structures, priorities, and means – which a feminist approach necessitates. However, they hope that the study can contribute to the process of systematically changing how foreign policy operates, whom it is made for, and whom it is informed by.

2. TIMING OF THE STUDY

There has never been a more opportune time to implement an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. This is driven by several current and paralleled developments, some of which encourage an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, whilst others demand such a foreign policy approach. Those developments that encourage a Feminist Foreign Policy are: an increasing number of states within and outside the EU adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy; a growing number of states making gender equality a priority within and for their foreign policies; the new EU Commission’s priorities on addressing the climate emergency, strengthening our democracies, and promoting a union where everyone has the same access to opportunities; the EU Commission’s new Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as well as Germany’s Presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2020. Moreover, 2020 is a year of historic anniversaries for the international feminist movement, including the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 as well as Beijing +25. Such developments are conducive for a European Feminist Foreign Policy.

“There has never been a more opportune time to implement an EU Feminist Foreign Policy.”
Intersectionality is a framework for understanding how multiple forms of inequalities, such as those based on gender, race, class, sexuality, ability, etc., can overlap, exacerbate each other, and create unique modes of discrimination (Crenshaw, 2018).

These factors include a growing European nativist populism, a rise of authoritarian political leaders around the world, increasing attacks on women's and LGBTQI+ rights, and ongoing calls by numerous actors for a common foreign and security policy.

With regards to the aforementioned encouraging developments, European states that have adopted or plan to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy include Sweden and France. Denmark, Switzerland, and Norway have a strong gender equality-focused foreign policy, and Spain, Luxembourg, and Cyprus have very recently announced their intent to either develop a Feminist Foreign Policy or make gender equality a priority. Non-European countries that have adopted a Feminist Foreign Policy include Canada, and most recently in January 2020, Mexico.

Furthermore, Ursula von der Leyen, a strong advocate for gender equality, is leading the EU Commission. Her Union of Equality (Von der Leyen, 2019) describes a feminist vision for the EU and the early March 2020 publication of the Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (EU Commission, 2020a). With a more progressive approach than previous reports (though substantial criticism remains (see II.2)), the 2020 report can be seen as the domestic starting point for the development of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. Additionally, some of the Commission’s priority areas can also be seen as a good starting point for a Feminist Foreign Policy. For example, the focus on the climate emergency and the so-called “promotion of the European way of life”, and, more specifically, the core area of “fighting discrimination and promoting gender equality, particularly by safeguarding the rule of law and fundamental rights” (EU Commission, 2020b).

Another encouraging factor is the German Presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2020. The German Federal Foreign Ministry is increasingly prioritising gender equality. In March 2020, it launched the report Gender equality in German foreign policy and in the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020). Moreover, the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda is one of the priorities of Germany’s current non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

By providing a vision for a more just and equal world and by linking the individual and collective emancipation to societal transformation, including the redistribution of power and resources, a foreign policy based on the values of intersectional feminism is the most promising response to many of the worrying external developments at the moment (Wichterich, 2016). These include the international unprecedented backlash on women’s and human rights (Provost and White, 2017), the mainstreaming of nativist populism ideas in countries including Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Hungary, Denmark, Poland, and beyond (Raj, 2020).

While finalising this study, another driver demanding a Feminist Foreign Policy has emerged: the Covid-19 pandemic. The current global health crisis has unveiled new and reinforced existing structural inequalities between genders and beyond, perhaps more than any crisis before. Women are more vulnerable to becoming sick, as they constitute the majority of the front-line health workers most exposed to the infectious disease, across most nations (Gupta, 2020). While intimate partner violence was a huge issue before the crisis, the increase in gender-based violence across nations is staggering (Wanqing, 2020). In many places across the world, conservative and right-wing politicians are using the crisis to restrict women’s reproductive rights by declaring these services

---

1 Intersectionality is a framework the ways multiple forms of inequalities because of one’s gender, race, class, sexuality, ability, etc. overlap, exacerbate each other and create unique modes of discrimination (Crenshaw, 2018).
as ‘non-essential’. Most importantly, the crisis has triggered a debate about how states prepare and finance to ensure citizens are safe (Acheson, 2020). From protective gear to intensive care beds and ventilators – governments across the globe are struggling to provide its citizens with appropriate medical care when, in 2019, they increased military expenditure by the largest annual growth in a decade (SIPRI, 2020). The launch of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy would be an important and timely message to communicate, as civil society around the world is being suppressed at unprecedented levels, with women’s rights and feminist organisations being hit the hardest. As the Atlas der Zivilgesellschaft (Jakob et al., 2020) by Civicus and Brot für die Welt shows, only 3 percent of the world’s population lives in countries where civil society is not suppressed. Consequently, the time is ripe for an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. A Feminist Foreign Policy can achieve the goals stipulated in the EU Global Strategy, including the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security, because, as illustrated throughout this report, there cannot and will not be peace without feminism.

3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

3.1 Lacking Consultations

The authors have strived to include as many perspectives as possible in this study. However, given the limited scope and timeframe, the study has been produced with limited consultations with feminist organisations within EU member states and, most importantly, without the consultation of feminist actors in EU partner countries: those who are impacted, positively and negatively, by the EU external action. Thus, one of the most important recommendations of this study is to hold inclusive consultations in all of the EU partner countries and to host consultations on an EU Feminist Foreign Policy with representatives of feminist organisations across the world.²

3.2 Definition of Foreign and Security Policy

The study focuses on the EU external action, leaving aside the EU’s policies on trade, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and migration. A Feminist Foreign Policy, however, requires a feminist approach to all parts of foreign and domestic policy, as even the most

“As such, any trade and economic policies that are not feminist and not striving to pro-actively eradicate inequalities are likely to perpetuate injustice and consequently fuel conflict.”

²Acknowledging the risk of consultation reinforcing structural discrimination, the authors would like to draw the attention to the tool ‘Beyond Consultations’ developed by GAPS UK and other organisations (2019), which gives concrete guidance to meaningful engagement with women in fragile and conflict-affected states.
"Implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy requires radical shifts in how foreign policy is being conducted."

Peace and Freedom identified economic injustice and competition for economic resources as a root cause of conflict. As such, any trade and economic policies that are not feminist and not striving to pro-actively eradicate inequalities are likely to perpetuate injustice and consequently fuel conflict. Thus, we advocate for an EU Feminist Foreign Policy to include a comprehensive and thorough analysis based on the principles of a feminist political economy, that goes beyond the inclusion of gender chapters in free trade agreements but also "denounce[s] the unjust effects of neoliberal economic policies and co-operation on human rights, particularly on women’s rights" (WILPF, 2019) and advocates for an international treaty that would create obligations for states to prevent human rights abuses by corporations. The authors strongly recommend accompanying this study with a feminist analysis of all other foreign policy areas. Where possible within this study, we have pointed out the implications of these other policies for the EU external action to highlight their interconnectedness.

3.3 The Gendered Discourse on Foreign Policy

"If the application of a feminist foreign policy doesn’t change practice, it isn’t feminist" (Ridge et al., 2019, p.5).

While writing this study, the authors felt the consequences of the gendered discourse on peace and security every step of the way. Aiming to compile a useful study for policymakers in Brussels and beyond, they have often reflected: Is the recommendation too utopian? Will it be taken seriously? Feminist organisations have endured such critiques for the last century as they have advocated for an end of the international arms trade and a revised definition of security. However, implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy requires radical shifts in how foreign policy is being conducted, how it is talked about, and who is making the decisions. Taking this seriously requires substantial policy shifts, which disrupt existing power inequalities, and will unsettle many actors across the EU and beyond. Our criticism and recommendations are aimed at encouraging this radical shift in the EU external action. Nevertheless, we attempt to use existing narratives and policies by and within the EU as a starting point, to recommend concrete steps that can lead to this change, and encourage and support those inside and outside advocating for this radical shift.

"Taking this seriously requires substantial policy shifts, which disrupt existing power inequalities, and will unsettle many actors across the EU and beyond."
Part 2

II

The Status Quo of Feminist Foreign Policy
The Status Quo of Feminist Foreign Policy

1. FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WORLD
1.1 The Prevalence of Feminist Foreign Policies

When looking at the history and the status quo of Feminist Foreign Policy, and feminism in international affairs more broadly, many observers often begin with then Foreign Minister Margot Wallström’s announcement of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014. However, the authors of the study – as many other feminist organisations – consider it imperative to acknowledge the decades-long work feminists have done to enable Wallström’s announcement in the first place. As early as 1915, 1500 women and feminists gathered in The Hague and held the International Congress of Women, demanding an end to the First World War and the dismantling of the military-industrial complex. Many of the 20 resolutions adopted at this 1915 conference are of acute relevance today for feminists in foreign policy (Adams et al., 2003). From this conference, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom emerged, one of the most influential feminist international affairs organisations. Over the years, feminist international relations theory has gained ground owing to prolific academics and theorists including Cynthia Enloe, whose 1990 book Bananas, Beaches and Bases – Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Enloe, 2014) revolutionised how scholars and activists understand conflict and militarism.

These developments paved the way for the Swedish government to announce its Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014, which has inspired many other governments to rethink their approach to foreign policy. Most recently, in January 2020, Mexico announced its Feminist Foreign Policy, while Canada has been pursuing a feminist development cooperation and France has been developing a feminist diplomacy. This section gives an overview of the state of the art of Feminist Foreign Policy. It outlines Sweden, Canada, and France and Mexico’s approaches to Feminist Foreign Policy. It also introduces Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework, developed by leading thinkers under the leadership of the International Center for Research and Women, “As early as 1915 1.500 women and feminists gathered in The Hague and held the International Congress of Women, demanding an end to the First World War and the dismantling of the military-industrial complex.”
and briefly discusses the paper Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy by the Council on Foreign Relationship. By providing this information, this study gives an overview of the state of the art of Feminist Foreign Policy.

### 1.1.1 Sweden

When in 2014, the self-proclaimed feminist government of Sweden introduced their Feminist Foreign Policy, it was initially met with skepticism (Rothschild, 2014). Sceptics questioned what a Feminist Foreign Policy entailed, and whether such an ‘utopian’ approach to foreign policy was appropriate and timely, just months after Russia had illegally annexed Crimea with using military force. Over time, the Swedish government defined the concepts, and the sceptics quietened. In 2018, it published its Handbook – Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (Government Office of Sweden, 2019, p.11) which outlines its Feminist Foreign Policy as “a working method and a perspective that takes three Rs as its starting points and is based on a fourth R.” Sweden’s three ‘Rs’ include the promotion of all women’s and girls’ full enjoyment of human rights, of women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels (representation) and the allocation of resources to promote gender equality. The Swedish government attaches great importance to the fact that its Feminist Foreign Policy is not only based on an idealistic normative idea but also has a solid empirical basis, hence adding the fourth ‘R’ for reality.

Swedish foreign policy is divided into three main areas: foreign and security policy, development cooperation, and trade and promotion policy. Foreign and security policy is divided into peace and security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and disarmament and non-proliferation. The concrete objectives, direction, and measures for 2019-2022 are articulated in the Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy (Government Office of Sweden, 2018). The international frameworks that form the basis for Sweden’s foreign policy include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the declarations and action plans from the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), and the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994), as well as the final documents from the follow-up conferences, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), the Sustainable Development Goals (2016), as well as the EU’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in EU’s External Relations (2016 – 2020), which Sweden is understood to have been a driving force.

It is important to note that Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy is part of a bigger feminist structure, as Sweden’s whole government is self-defined as ‘feminist’. Stockholm has a dedicated Minister for Gender Equality who has the overall responsibility for their gender equality policies, and each ministry has a person in char-
To realise their feminist vision, the Swedish government is implementing the following working methods within the Swedish Foreign Service: leadership, ownership, guidance, and support. 'Leadership' includes continuous references to the policy in speeches, articles, and social media; a prioritisation of these issues during visits as well as concrete policy decisions and initiatives. The Swedish government has further appointed a Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy, Ann Bernes. Bernes and her team are responsible for lending 'support' to the whole system. "All employees of the Swedish Foreign Service can contact the coordination team, but they can also contact the focal point(s) for the Feminist Foreign Policy appointed at every department and mission abroad" (Government Office of Sweden, 2019, p. 39).

When it comes to resources, 90 percent of Sweden’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) is earmarked for gender equality, “either as a principal or significant objective, although the precise dollar amount invested is unclear” (Thompson and Clement, 2019, p.2). Sweden’s first dedicated Strategy for development cooperation for global gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights 2018-2022 encompasses approx. 105 million USD (1.000 million SEK). The strategy reinforces its Feminist Foreign Policy and enables support for strategic partners that drive the development for a more gender-equal society on a global and regional level. However, with development cooperation being only one area of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, it remains unclear how much money is invested overall to achieve the feminist policy goals within Sweden’s foreign policy.

According to Bernes, there are multiple monitoring and evaluation schemes in place. This includes the Action Plan for Feminist Foreign Policy 2019-2022, which is integrated into the Foreign Service’s regular action plan and systematically updated annually. The Action Plan also provides guidance and working methods for the implementation of the Feminist Foreign Policy and complements and reinforces other relevant tools such as Sweden’s National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2016–2020. Furthermore, in 2019, the Swedish government presented the

1 Private conversation on 12 March 2020.
first Government Communication on Feminist Foreign Policy to the Swedish Parliament. The communication accounts for Feminist Foreign Policy, its tools and arenas, and for the different ways in which the policy has contributed to the thematic and geographical areas of Sweden's foreign policy. Moreover, the development cooperation channelled through Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), is also evaluated both internally and by external evaluators.

### 1.1.2 Canada

In June 2017, Canada announced its feminist development policy when Canada’s aid programme was renamed into Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP) (Open Canada, 2017). The impetus for this shift was to “reduce extreme poverty and build a more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous world” (Ibid). In addition to FIAP, Canada has introduced a series of other gender equality initiatives as part of their foreign and security policy, including its new National Action Plan For the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022, a feminist approach to trade, and the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (Ibid). Canada’s FIAP covers six action areas (Government of Canada, 2020b): gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, human dignity (health and nutrition, sexual and reproductive health and rights, education, humanitarian action), growth that works for everyone, environment and climate action, inclusive governance, and peace and security.

Whilst Canada has applied a gender lens to a diverse set of foreign policy there has not yet been a comprehensive Feminist Foreign Policy. However, in a speech on 21 February 2020, Canadian Foreign Minister François-Philippe Champagne announced extending their feminist approach beyond their FIAP, saying “[o]ur agenda on women, peace and security is a central element of our policy. In fact, during this mandate, I will strengthen the foundations of this policy by working with civil society to launch a white paper on Canada’s feminist foreign policy” (Government of Canada, 2020a). Thompson and Clement (2019) outline that the launch of FIAP in 2017 was accompanied by concrete financial commitments: Canada committed to a 95 percent benchmark of its foreign assistance to gender equality as a target, with 15 percent as principal target (according to OECD standards). “This is a significant hike from just 2.4 percent from 2015-2016 and 6.5 percent from 2016-2017 on gender as a principal marker and 68 percent and 75 percent on gender significant for the same years” (Thompson and Clement, 2019, p.3). Furthermore, in June 2019, Canada’s government pledged another 330 million Canadian dollars to women’s rights organisations (Little, 2019). Thirty millions of this pledge are dedicated to domestic feminist organisations, while the remaining amount was given to the newly established Equality Fund to fund ‘Feminist Futures’, predominantly in developing countries. The Equality Fund is the single largest investment in women’s rights organisations by a government (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020). Canada is prioritising this, as “[a]ccording to the OECD, globally only 0.5% of international assistance earmarked for gender equality goes to women’s rights organizations” (Government of Canada, 2019).

Putting Canada’s financial commitments into perspective: the advocacy group lobbying the G7 on women’s rights – known as the Women 7 – “called for the G7 to embrace Feminist Foreign Policies that included feminist official development assistance, which they define as committing to a floor of 20 percent of funding for programs that seek to promote gender equality as a principal goal, and 85 percent for programs that seek to advance gender equality as at least a significant goal, as defined by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee” (Thompson, 2019). While this recommenda-
tion is lower than the aforementioned commitment by Canada (95 percent), it is in line with the EU’s recommendation for its member states, and significantly more than what most G7 members are currently spending (Ibid).

Canada has also focused on evaluation and analysis, using Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+). This is a tool for policy analysis, which Canada also integrates into all of its foreign policy and defence analysis. According to Bigio and Vogelstein (2020, p.7), “GBA+ has a long history in Canada, beginning with a government commitment to GBA+ as part of Canada’s response to the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.” They add: “in the 2000s, GBA+ was mainstreamed across central agencies, and in 2016 the government strengthened accountability metrics, including by requiring GBA+ memos in submissions to the Cabinet and Treasury and mandating that all federal staff receive training” (Ibid).

In 2018, Canada held the G7 Presidency, put gender equality – for the first time – on the agenda for the G7 annual meeting, and established a G7 Gender Equality Advisory Council. The following year, France continued this approach during their G7 Presidency.

1.1.3 France

Calling “gender equality the great cause of President Macron’s term”, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and Secretary of Equality Marlenè Schiappa announced a feminist approach to their diplomacy (France Diplomatie, 2019) in an op-ed on International Women’s Day in 2019. The responsibility for France’s feminist diplomacy sits with both the Ministry for European and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Gender Equality. This was the first time that France’s foreign policy was dubbed ‘feminist’ despite gender equality strategies having been in place for several years. However, despite deliberately using the term ‘Feminist Foreign Policy’ in the op-ed, the text itself focuses only on allocating resources to the French Development Agency (AFD): 120 million Euros by 2022 the budget for initiatives primarily aimed at reducing gender inequality is expected to reach a total of 700 million Euros annually. It also cited an intention to combat sexualised and sexist violence, promoting the education of girls and women as well as boys and men, and lastly, fostering women’s economic empowerment with a focus on Africa.

As stipulated in France’s International Strategy On Gender Equality (2018 – 2022) (French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2018), the French government acknowledges that gender cannot be limited to development cooperation but needs to be mainstreamed throughout all areas of foreign policy to be effective (Ibid). France’s International Strategy on Gender Equality is the groundwork behind its announcement of a feminist diplomacy in 2019. It has five main objectives: promotion of a stronger institutional culture of gender equality; stepping up France’s political advocacy efforts on gender equality; increasing and improving integration of gender equality in ODA; improving and strengthening the visibility, transparency and accountability of action taken by the Mi-

“Amongst others, the French High Council for Gender Equality, comprising of academics, activists, and researchers, is in charge of regularly evaluating France’s Strategy for Gender Equality. In each French Ministry, there is one civil servant at the director’s level responsible for gender equality.”
Climate justice recognises that those who are least responsible for climate change suffer the gravest consequences, and that fair and just solutions must recognise issues of equality, human rights, collective rights and historical responsibility for climate change (Boom, Richards and Leonard 2016, p.7).


1.1.4 Mexico

In January 2020, Mexico announced its Feminist Foreign Policy, becoming the first country in the Global South to do so (Gobierno de México, 2020). Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy has five main elements: promoting a foreign policy with a gender perspective and feminist agenda; achieving gender parity within the Mexican foreign office (currently only one of the eleven top positions is filled by a woman (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020); combatting gender-based violence, including within the ministry; making equality visible; and practicing intersectional feminism (Gobierno de México, 2020). An example of Mexico’s comprehensive approach, which also focuses on the link between gender discrimination and climate justice, is the Government’s commitment and leadership during the 2019 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) in Spain, where it “promoted gender equality as a non-negotiable component of any agreement on climate change” (Thompson, 2020b).

According to Cristopher Ballinas, Director General for Human Rights and Democracy in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE), Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy is not only a question of gender but of human rights in general. “For us, it is not only a Feminist Foreign Policy, but a Feminist Foreign Policy plus, because we are also including LGBTQI individuals and the disabled”, say Ballinas, adding that “we want to have a state-of-the-art Feminist Foreign Policy”. According to Ballinas, Mexico’s decision to announce a Feminist Foreign Policy is also partially a response to strong feminist mobilization in Mexico and Latin America which aims at building a more just and prosperous society (Gobierno de México, 2020).

Mexico has outlined precise timelines to achieve an ambitious number of immediate actions across these five areas of engagement. “Training, workshops, working groups, and manuals are to be developed and deployed within the first year. By 2024, the government is aiming for full employment parity, equal pay, and the application of a gender lens to every foreign-policy position, resolution, and mandate” (Thompson, 2020b). Thompson (2020b) describes Mexican Feminist Foreign Policy as...

---

4 Climate justice recognises that those who are least responsible for climate change suffer the gravest consequences, and that fair and just solutions must recognise issues of equality, human rights, collective rights and historical responsibility for climate change (Boom, Richards and Leonard 2016, p.7).

“Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy is not only a question of gender but of human rights in general. “For us, it is not only a Feminist Foreign Policy, but a Feminist Foreign Policy plus, because we are also including LGBTQI individuals and the disabled.”

“a foundation for what is emerging as a global gold standard”. The Mexican Government is currently developing concrete targets as well as an evaluation scheme, and together with France, was supposed to be hosting the Generation Equality Forums to be held in Mexico City (in May) and Paris (in July) this to mark the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Platform for Action.

1.1.5 Criticism towards existing Feminist Foreign Policies

By introducing its Feminist Foreign Policy, Sweden set in motion a growing movement. In addition to Canada, France, and Mexico, Spain (‘We will also adopt a feminist foreign policy’ (Gobierno de Espana, 2020)) and Luxembourg (‘The coalition agreement stipulates that Luxembourg will implement a feminist foreign policy’ (Le Gouvernement Du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2019)) have committed to developing a Feminist Foreign Policy. Malaysia has also indicated to announce a Feminist Foreign Policy in 2020 and very recently, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus has declared to focus on gender equality within their foreign policy. Until today, Sweden and Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy are the most comprehensive approaches, which also extend to their domestic policy spheres. Despite being a trailblazer and a visionary, there has been no shortage of criticism towards Sweden’s definition and implementation of its Feminist Foreign Policy by feminist activists. Most criticism centres around the binary conceptualisation of gender behind Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy and the lack of accounting for the rights and needs of LGBTQI+ individuals (Thompson and Clement, 2019); the continuous export of arms, including to authoritarian regimes, (Irsten, 2019); its migration and asylum policies, and the treatment of indigenous people: “[B]oth Canada and Sweden can be criticized for not sufficiently matching their care for distant other women living in

“Most criticism centres around the binary conceptualisation of gender behind Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy and the lack of accounting for the rights and needs of LGBTQI+ individuals; the continuous export of arms, including to authoritarian regimes, its migration and asylum policies, and the treatment of indigenous people.”

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Forums have post been postponed to 2021.
conflict or poverty-struck zones with an empathetic commitment to their own indigenous or marginalized refugee population” (Aggestam et al., 2019, p.32). Most of these critiques also apply to other governments that pursue a Feminist Foreign Policy.

Moreover, as feminist organisations like the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy and Reaching Critical Will argue, it is impossible to have a genuine Feminist Foreign Policy without strong political commitment towards a nuclear weapon-free world and towards demilitarization. However, with the exception of Mexico, no state pursuing a Feminist Foreign Policy has signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and France is one of the nine nuclear weapons possessing states.

1.2 Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework

At a press conference on 11 March 2020 in New York City, a group of leading thinkers and practitioners led by the International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW)’s Lyric Thompson presented Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework (Thompson, 2020a). Under the leadership of ICRW, this framework was developed over more than a year of research and global consultations with over 100 organizations in more than 40 countries around the world. It was further refined at a meeting in November 2019, which included representatives from the governments of Mexico, Sweden, Canada, and France, as well as several of foundations, development organisations, and advocacy groups, including the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy. This framework will be formalised and refined during the Beijing+25 Generation Equality Forums and its process, by a task force of feminist thinkers, advocates, and experts inside and outside of government. The framework includes key policy and implementation recommendations for governments, as well as supranational organisations.

The framework itself starts with deliberations over the use of the word ‘feminist’. The authors of the framework acknowledge the importance of articulating the term, because “this can be an important signal that a government is ready to pursue a more transformative approach to the advancement of gender equality and inclusion, in a manner that is intersectional and that focuses at its core on transforming power relations, not just lifting up some women”. However, they also note that “invoking the word ‘feminist’ can make people feel uncomfortable” (Thompson et al, 2020a, p.3).

The main contribution of the Framework is the identification of a Feminist Foreign Policy’s key ingredients:

(1) Purpose (a government’s specific purpose of adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy which must be linked to domestic policies);
(2) Definition (what does Feminist Foreign Policy mean to government(s) or the international organisation(s), based on an intersectional approach);
(3) Reach (what is the scope of the policy regarding the policy areas and the responsible government units);
(4) Intended outcomes and benchmarks (concrete outcomes that are to be achieved including the specification of a timeline);
(5) A plan to operationalise the Feminist Foreign Policy (how and when is the policy to be implemented) which includes resources, representation and inclusion, a reporting schedule, and capacity building.

This framework informs the structure of this study’s recommendation section for an EU Feminist Foreign Policy as well, making it the first of its kind to do so.

1.3 State of the Art Research: Understanding Gender Equality in Foreign Policy

In March 2020, researchers representing the Council on Foreign Relations presented the most comprehensive overview to date of how gender equality is integrated into foreign po-
The authors of the study, representing the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP), acknowledge the importance of this debate. However, CFFP proudly and deliberately carries ‘feminist’ in its name. One of the reasons for this is to honour those fearless activists who for hundreds of years have worked tirelessly and risked their lives to fight for the rights and liberties that many women today enjoy.

Concerning (2) policy, the authors of the report distinguish between gender equality strategies and National Action Plans for the Implementation for the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. A total of 20 out of 37 OECD countries have adopted gender equality strategies within their development agencies, and as of January 2020, 83 governments have adopted NAPs, beginning with the first in Denmark in 2005. Finally, concerning (3) resources, states have used four different tools to ensure that the goal of gender equality is being properly funded: aid targets; gender budgeting; gender equality funds; pooled funds, and collective initiatives. Regarding aid targets, “the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a set of minimum criteria for programs that have either a principal or a significant focus on gender equality, which are frequently used as benchmarks for targeting gender equality investments” (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020, p.6; see below for an overview of DAC gender principal and general targets). However, overall investments in aid to advance gender equality remain low. "According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee, only 4 percent of bilateral aid by OECD nations in 2015-16 was dedicated to gender equality programming … [o]ne independent review of seventy-two projects accounting for $6 billion of years have worked tirelessly and risked their lives to fight for the rights and liberties that many women today enjoy.

“2019 saw an all-time high of women ministers globally at 20.7 percent. Thirty-four countries have women foreign ministers, 84 have women trade ministers”
in gender equality funding found only two met OECD standards’ (Ibid, p.26).

Gender budgeting was first introduced in Australia in 1984, and at least 80 countries today apply a basic level of gender budgeting. 23 countries have more integrated and elaborate gender budgeting initiatives. Regarding gender equality funds, the Canadian Equality Fund is one of the most prominent examples. Others include Australia’s $55 million Gender Equality Fund, established in 2015. Pooled funds and collective initiatives include the UN Women Gender Equality Fund (Germany, Israel, Japan and Spain are major donors), the $450 million SheDecides initiative by Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Sweden, or the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative housed at the World Bank and funded by fourteen governments.

The research by Bigio and Vogelstein (2020) perfectly illustrates the many innovative and possible ways governments can introduce more feminist and gender-equal measures into their foreign and security policy. However, in the following section, we will argue that for a foreign policy to be able to sustainably contribute to a more just and peaceful world, a holistic feminist approach to foreign and security policy is needed; an approach that rethinks the very tenets traditional foreign and security policy is based on instead of adding women, positions, or measures in an isolated way.

2. FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE EU EXTERNAL ACTION

In the 1990s, the EU began its long and still unfinished journey towards gender mainstrea-
The Strategic Approach misquotes Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, by referring to equality between men and women instead of equality between women and men (Davis, 2018, p.9).

27

ming, shifting (nominally) the focus to the structures and institutions that maintain the status quo. Such an approach was in line with the thinking present at the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Key to this cognitive shift was the recognition that existing structures are not gender neutral, and that refusing to acknowledge this leads to gender-neutral policies exacerbating divisions. In 1996, the EU rolled out its gender mainstreaming plan across all policy areas, reaffirming the approach in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (European Commission, 2005).

The concept of gender equality, or a gender perspective for that matter, made its way into the EU’s external policy discourse through its development policies. Until 1995 in Beijing, the EU’s approach to gender in its development policy was based on the Women-in-Development perspective which aimed at tackling the persistent exclusion of women from the development process by creating projects for women specifically. This thinking was very much in line with the dominant domestic discourse on gender in the EU itself: an understanding of positive actions as providing a ‘step-ladder’ to women, preparing them to operate in a male dominated world without aiming to question or change dominant power structures. Following Beijing, the EU shifted to the Gender-and-Development approach, which ostensibly recognised the need to engage in thinking on the relations between genders, which holds women as the central subject but focuses more broadly on gender (Debusscher, 2011).

In recent years, various EU bodies have developed initiatives, policies, and strategies that, to a certain extent, incorporate a gender perspective or proactively pursue gender equality through or within the EU external action. The Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security is probably the most prominent example of them. Despite the commitment to “systemically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions”, as defined inter alia in the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016, p.11), many challenges in sustainably fostering gender equality, let alone implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy, remain. Two of the biggest challenges are the dominant narratives around gender and gender equality, which the following section discusses in reference to the most important EU policies and initiatives on gender equality. Subsequently, this section will highlight how these challenges translate into concrete policies leading to gender-blind and inconsistent policies.

2.1 A Flawed Understanding of Gender and Gender Equality

2.1.1 A Limited Understanding of Gender

Despite already having recognised in 2008 that gender is "socially constructed" and "not only about women" (Council of the EU, 2008, p.5), throughout the EU external action, gender remains widely understood to be synonymous with (white, heterosexual) women (Davis, 2018). The Strategic Approach to Women, Pea-
“Despite already having recognised in 2008 that gender is “socially constructed” and “not only about women”, throughout the EU external action, gender remains widely understood to be synonymous with (white, heterosexual) women.”

ce and Security (Council of the EU, 2018) (Strategic Approach) as well as the recently launched Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (EU Commission, 2020a) refer to equality between women and men in their introductions, thereby framing the debate in these terms. Welcomingly, both documents also refer to the intersecting discrimination many women face,” and the Gender Equality Strategy explicitly expresses the need to include intersectional perspectives in gender equality strategies. Unfortunately, within the Strategic Approach, sexual minorities and gender non-conforming people are not mentioned, and in the Gender Equality Strategy, they are only mentioned in a reference to another EU policy document.

By continuing to frame gender narrowly, the EU – similar to the UN – reproduces an exclusive and binary understanding of gender, which is based on stereotypical ideas of women and men (Muehlenhoff 2017). This understanding excludes gender non-confirming people and sexual minorities (Davis, 2018). Importantly, this understanding ignores the “power relationships between gender” (Davis 2018, p.4), and gender as “a way of categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power, of hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories of people, and different human activities symbolical-

“By continuing to frame gender narrowly, the EU – similar to the UN – reproduces an exclusive and binary understanding of gender, which is based on stereotypical ideas of women and men.”

serve in masculine hard-security roles, disregarding women from other parts of the world (Davis, 2018). As Davis (2018, p.10) states, this does not only “deny ‘Other’ women the opportunities extended to European women but risks essentialising European women’s participation.” This may be taken to represent the universal Women and used as cover to deny Other women’s participation and agency”. This is in line with Mara Stern’s analysis of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the predecessor of the EU Global Strategy. Stern argues that the EU acts as a “civilising patriarch” aiming “to civilise barbaric Others through, at best, example, and at worst, force” (Stern, 2011, p.50). Interviews

10 ‘Othering is an interdisciplinary notion that refers, amongst other things, to differentiating discourses that lead to moral and political judgment of superiority and inferiority between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and within groups’ (Dervin, 2015). The term was coined by Edward Said in his book Orientalism (1978). The authors here follow Stern’s (2011, p.28/34) analysis that the ESS reflects the division between Europeans and Others, who are represented as both feminised and subordinate.
“Interviews conducted by the authors as part of this study have reinforced the idea that women from EU partner countries are (subconsciously) seen as ‘beneficiaries’ of EU conflict prevention while the expertise and perspective they bring to the table are overlooked or not taken seriously.”

Conducted by the authors as part of this study have reinforced the idea that women from EU partner countries are (subconsciously) seen as ‘beneficiaries’ of EU conflict prevention while the expertise and perspective they bring to the table are overlooked or not taken seriously. The strong differentiation between EU citizens and Others, and the stereotypical representation of the Other, also strongly affects men in EU partner countries, who are often portrayed in a highly gendered and racialised manner. For example, a promotional video for the EU Global Strategy portrays insecurity as brown men (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019).

2.1.2 Equality for the Sake of Efficiency

In contrast to the UN, the EU has emphasised women’s agency, in addition to the recognition that women are uniquely impacted by violence and conflict. Indeed, the Strategic Approach lists “women’s leadership, rights and agency” as its first basic principles (Council of the EU, 2018, p.8). Unfortunately, the emphasis of women's agency within the EU external action often follows instrumental and neoliberal argumentation. This embeds the discussion in neoliberal market logic that favours gender equality for the benefit of more effective security instead of as a goal in itself (Muehlenhoff, 2017). Too often, "women’s agency is framed through the lens of (...) empowerment, with it justified as adding value to the overarching policy objectives and strategy” (Haastrup, Wright and Guerrina, 2019, p.68). The Strategic Approach, for example, reads: “Women’s meaningful equitable participation is both critical for effective prevention policies and their implementation” (Council of the EU, 2018, p.33). Along the same line, the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities lists the identification of female mediators, the promotion of the representation of women, and the availability of gender expertise from an early stage of mediation processes as one measure to strengthen the EU’s mediation capacities (Council of the EU, 2009). The Implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in the Context of the ESDP states: “Gender mainstreaming in the area of the ESDP is not a goal in itself; the ultimate objective is to increase the EU’s crisis management capacity by mobilising additional resources and exploiting

“Unfortunately, the emphasis of women’s agency within the EU external action often follows instrumental and neoliberal argumentation. This embeds the discussion in neoliberal market logic that favours gender equality for the benefit of more effective security instead of as a goal in itself.”

---

11 Neoliberal argumentation embeds the discussion about gender equality in the logic of the market, in which gender equality becomes part of an economic calculation. Emanicipation is seen as an individual task to which the state bears no or little responsibility (Muehlenhoff, 2017, p.155).
the full potential of human resources available and to make the mission more effective in establishing peace and security and strengthening democratic value” (Council of European Union 2005, p.3; based on Muehlenhoff, 2017, p.162). The same neoliberal argumentation has been criticised in reference to the EU’s work on development and social policies. The Framework for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (through external relations 2016-2020) reads: “Gender equality is not just a matter of social justice, but also one of ‘smart economics’: women’s participation in the economy is essential for sustainable development and economic growth” (EU Commission, 2015).

This approach is problematic for various reasons. It positions women’s rights and gender equality as an instrument in achieving the EU external action’s objectives, and not an independent goal of the EU external action itself (Muehlenhoff, 2017). This implies that violence and instability are gender-neutral and that the EU’s goals to promote peace and stability can be achieved without mainstreaming gender. If a gender perspective is introduced it is only done to make EU efforts Gender is an afterthought; an ingredient that can (only) be added to inherently gender-neutral policy areas (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018b). This, in turn, often leads to the so-called ‘add-women-and-stir’ approach, which focuses on adding/including women into existing structures and policies without acknowledging the gendered dimensions of conflict and without transforming these existing structures and policies to create truly equal societies (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020). Moreover, using this ‘business case’ argumentation is highly dangerous. It allows for a backlash against fair power distribution: ‘adding women’ will not lead to increased efficiency or better outcomes. Furthermore, given the smaller numbers of other politically marginalised groups, and the limited impact of their inclusion in terms of efficiency or impact, a ‘business case’ argumentation hinders the application of an intersectional approach. Moreover, the ‘add-women-and-stir’ approach often leads to the conviction that – for women to be able to positively influence foreign and security policies – they need to be empowered first (Muehlenhoff, 2017, p.160). This understanding places the responsibility on the individual who, with some support, “can overcome their marginalisation using their own resources” (Ibid, p.157). This approach makes emancipation an individual task and ignores the structural causes of the marginalisation of political minorities, including the effects neoliberal economies have had on women and other political minorities across the globe. It also prevents serious confrontation with the impact of EU policies on women’s lives, such as the EU’s agricultural policies or the international arms trade by EU member states (Ibid, p.161).

2.2 The Consequences: Flawed and Inconsistent Policies

This flawed understanding of gender and gender equality, the failure to systematically
acknowledge the gendered drivers of conflict and stability, and the misinterpreted notion that peace and security are gender-neutral, as well as the underrepresentation of women within the internal EU structures from the Commission to the EEAS to the EU missions and delegations, have left gender “on the margins of the EU external action” (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020, p.2), except for specific recommendations in the ’Women, Peace and Security’ framework. Consequently, many of the EU policies remain either gender-blind, inadequately gender-sensitive, and often inconsistent or siloed. These policies, by failing to acknowledge and to address gendered dimensions of international peace and security, will ‘Do Harm’, even when “successful” (Davis, 2018, p.4).

The following section will highlight these consequences by analysing the EU’s policies to counterterrorism, prevent violent extremism, and prevent conflict as well as the EU’s approach to security.

2.2.1 Gender-blind policies

2.2.1.1 EU Policies on Countering Terrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism

Despite the increasing importance the EU places on countering and preventing violent extremism and terrorism, the Counter Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU, 2005) is entirely gender-blind (Davis, 2018). There is simply no reference to gender, or even women or men. The same holds for the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU on combating terrorism (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 2017). The European Commission Communication on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism also fails to account for the gendered dynamics of violent extremism but does acknowledge that also women (and youth) are recruited by violent extremism groups. The only other time women are mentioned is in relation to how the EU is supporting partner states in tackling the underlying factors of radicalisation, inter alia by “empowering women” (European Commission, 2016, p.14). This policy directly translates into flawed actions and outcomes. As Davis (2018, p.11) highlights, the EU “funded Radicalisation Awareness Network, for example, does not integrate gender analysis into its work and does not appear to have produced a distinct analysis of how gender functions and intertwines with radicalisation or its causes.” And in contrast to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), the EU does not have a distinguished gender expert in its team working to prevent and counter violent extremism. Moreover, the EU Commission’s Communication specifically focuses on Islamist extremism, and white-supremacy and far-right extremism are not mentioned.

The lack of accounting for the gender dimensions of violent extremism with the EU’s policies stands in sharp contrast to how violent extremist groups like Boko Haram and ISIL operate, who often “understand the importance [for recruiting men and women] of gender dynamics extremely well” (Dier, 2019). Aleksandra Dier, Gender Expert at UNCTED explains: “Violent extremists often draw on concepts of hyper-masculinity to address male feelings of disempowerment, resentment and marginalisation. Incorporating this into our analysis and our policies is an essential part of addressing the root causes of radicalisation” (Ibid). Moreover, they are very capable of recruiting women by

12 The ‘Do No Harm’ approach, coined by Mary Anderson (1999) acknowledges that humanitarian aid can have unintended negative consequences and calls for humanitarian actors to develop policies that anticipate, monitor and prevent these consequences. Today, many actors also in the development cooperation and peacebuilding follow this approach (Barnett and Weiss, 2008).

13 Women are mentioned one more time in the document, when the equality of men and women is mentioned as a principle the EU stands for. Again, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union is misquoted here.
addressing the marginalisation many women and girls experience in their societies, thereby "co-opting and exploiting women’s rights and the women’s empowerment agenda" (Ibid). Thus, it is key that the EU adopts a gender-sensitive approach in preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism, which accounts for the gendered drivers of all forms of radicalisation and develops gender-sensitive strategies in preventing radicalisation. This includes addressing destructive masculinities, as well as gender-sensitive and human-rights-based policies on the prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration of former fighters. A gender-sensitive approach to prevention and countering violent extremism also needs to account for the impact counter-terrorism strategies have on the rights of political minorities, women, and LGBTQI+ human rights defenders, and feminist civil society organisations (see: Dier, 2019).

2.2.1.2 EU Policies on Conflict Prevention

Despite the EU’s commitment to include gender into conflict prevention, as outlined in the Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention (Council of the EU, 2011), gender inequality, and gendered norms as structural root causes of conflict are not systematically accounted for in the EU’s conflict prevention work. Gender analysis is not taken into consideration in the formulation of EU conflict prevention policy nor recognised as important (Davis, 2018), and the ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ agenda remains inadequately integrated into EU’s work on conflict prevention.

The Gothenburg Programme (Council of the EU, 2001), which still forms the basis of the EU’s engagement in this regard, is gender-blind (Davis 2018, p.15). Already in 2011, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) recommended the EU adopt a new conflict prevention document, which “should include substantive sections on gender and conflict prevention” (Woollard, 2011, p.15). The Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action (EEAS and European Commission, 2016) and the Factsheet Conflict Early Warning Analysis (EEAS, 2014) do not mention gender either. The recent Council of the EU’s Conclusion on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crisis (Council of the EU, 2018a) also does not refer to gender, or structural gender inequality, beyond a standard reference to the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda (Council of the EU, 2018, p.3).

While the EU Global Strategy acknowledges gendered dimensions of conflicts, it does not spell out what is meant by this (Davis 2018). The Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (Council of the EU, 2009) acknowledges the importance of women’s meaningful participation and the EU’s responsibility to support this to ensure that mediation processes and peace negotiations can account for women’s experience in conflict, and consequent needs for justice and recovery.

Conflict prevention is framed as gender-neutral, despite the policies that were adopted after the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (and some of its sister resolutions) had already been passed. The Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities frames women’s participation as a means to achieve another objective, even if this objective is in the interest of women. This is not because they have a right to influence mediation and dialogue processes, or to ensure that women have a say in how the conflict is being settled, but ‘only’ to have their experiences in conflict accounted for. Additionally, in line with the abovementioned dominant understanding of gender, LGBTQI+ persons are absent in gender analysis and conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms, despite the adoption of the Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons (Council of the EU, 2013). In 2016, a study by Cornelissen and Hammelburg (2016) found that “70% of the
In contrast to the EU Commission and the EEAS, the EU Parliament has taken upon a political leadership role on implementing the WPS Agenda. Given its limited (advisory) capacity in the fields of security and defence, it has unfortunately limited power to influence the EEAS and EU Commissions policy on WPS (Guerrina and Wright, 2016).

LGBTIQI+ organisations surveyed across the world felt the local EU Delegation had missed opportunities to implement these guidelines” (Davis, 2018, p.15).

As feminist research has highlighted over decades, gender-blind conflict prevention policies will Do Harm by reinforcing existing structural gendered inequalities and dominant (gendered) interests present in conflict context (Davis, 2018, p.4). Thus, EU conflict prevention mechanisms must be reformed to account for the gendered dimensions of conflict and to address the gendered structural causes of conflict, including patriarchy and gender inequalities, militarism and violence, the political economy of war, and the impact of neo-liberalism (Rees and Chinkin, 2016). Kapur and Rees (2019, p.137) lay four transformative shifts that help contribute to a more methodological approach to preventing conflict:

- Transforming gender relations;
- Challenging, transforming, and eliminating violent militarised power relations and militarisation;
- Ensuring sustainable equitable social and economic development;
- Promoting restorative agency.

In contrast to dominant approach, this would be a very realistic method to international security, as feminist research postulates “the higher the level of gender inequalities within a state, the greater the likelihood such a state will experience internal and interstate conflict” (Ibid, p.138, based on Hudson et al., 2008/2009), fragility or terrorism (Hudson, 2020). “This is, in short, because states characterised by gender discrimination and structural hierarchy are permeated with, and supported by, norms of violence that make conflict more likely” (Ibid, based on Hudson et al., 2008/2009). As noted at the beginning of the study, reforming our neo-liberal capitalist economy is also central to address the root causes of conflict and structural violence, but beyond the scope of this study.

2.2.2. Lacking Policy Coherence and Flawed Understanding of Security

In addition to gender-blind or lack of adequate gender-sensitive policies, many of the EU policies remain siloed and inconsistently streamlined across EU external action – partly as a result of the flawed understanding of gender and gender equality as outlined above. The following section will outline these consequences by analysing the EU’s approach to peace and security, including the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda.

2.2.2.1 Implementation of the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ Agenda

In 2000, the UN Security Council, after massive lobbying of international feminist civil society, passed UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The objective was “the prevention of armed conflict and a roll back of the escalating levels of militarisation making homes, communities and nations less rather than more secure” (Global Study, 2015, p.194). Together with its nine sister resolutions, the UN Security Resolution 1325 makes up the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda (WPS).

Despite a late start, over the last 12 years, the EU has adopted a comprehensive framework on implementing WPS, which has become the dominant framework in which gendered dimensions of conflict, crisis management, and peacebuilding are being addressed (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018a). In 2008, the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implementation of the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (Council of the EU, 2008) (Comprehensive Approach) made, for the first time in the context of the EU, the link between gender and security explicit, and outlined how WPS should be integrated into the EU external action (Haastrup, Wright and Guerrina, 2019). This policy was replaced in 2018 with the adoption

---

15In contrast to the EU Commission and the EEAS, the EU Parliament has taken upon a political leadership role on implementing the WPS Agenda. Given its limited (advisory) capacity in the fields of security and defence, it has unfortunately limited power to influence the EEAS and EU Commissions policy on WPS (Guerrina and Wright, 2016).
of the Council Conclusions and Strategic Approach on Women, Peace and Security (Council of the EU, 2018) (Strategic Approach), which represented for the first time a “framework for the implementation, and indeed a clear normative position of the EU on gender and foreign policy” (Haastrup, Wright and Guerrina, 2019, p.67). The EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which was adopted in 2019, outlined how the Strategic Approach should be implemented.

In particular, the Strategic Approach was welcomed “as representing significant progress in the EU’s engagement with WPS”, demonstrating that the EU has evolved in its understanding of gender and the transformative potential of WPS (Haastrup, Wright and Guerrina, 2019, p.67). However, certain shortcomings remain, some of which will be discussed below.

Despite important progress in moving away from the conception of gender as women in the Strategic Approach, gender is still “strongly associated with women and less on the actual notion of gender relations and (…) power” (Ibid). Further, despite acknowledging that women can face intersecting discrimination, the needs, perspective, and expertise of LGBTQI+ people are excluded from the Strategic Approach.

The Strategic Approach (as did the Comprehensive Approach to a lesser extent) recognises “women’s agency over victimhood” (Council of the EU, 2018, p.18). However, women are still represented in a neoliberal way, “emphasising their empowerment and resources to take care of themselves and contribute to peace, development and EU missions” (Muehlenhoff, 2017, p.159). This is reflected in the current EU Action Plan, in which the EU commits to “support and conduct capacity-building and mentoring for women’s leadership, for women negotiators and mediators to improve their effectiveness and the quality of their participation in peace processes and work towards reaching the minimum of 33% women participating in all EU activities and projects related to peace processes” (Council of the European Union, 2019, p.7).

Moreover, while the understanding of and commitment to WPS has certainly evolved over the last years, the EEAS struggles to translate this policy commitment to action. As Deiana and McDonagh (2018a) highlight, many EEAS staff members admit that they have not read the WPS resolutions, or other relevant policy documents. While gender advisors have very specialist and in-depth knowledge, many other staff members seemed unable to capture the essence of WPS, often framing the agenda as one that can be applied at their discretion (if applicable), and in order to improve the effectiveness of missions.

Furthermore, and in line with the analysis of the previous sections, one consistent criticism of the EU’s approach to WPS has been that it is seen as an ‘added value’ to (gender neutral) existing practices of security – from the analysis of security threats, to the identification of priorities and the decision on how to achieve these priorities (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018b). This trend – which is not unique to the EU – together with the emphasis of the WPS framework in fostering women’s participation in military structures (from national armies to UN peacekeeping missions) is often described as “securitising gender instead of gendering security” (Deiana and McDonagh, 2018a, p.42), or the “militarisation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325” (Kapur and Rees, 2019, p.139). “Instead of women changing the militarised system, the system has co-opted women into it” (Ibid). However, as feminist activists across the globe reiterate: the idea of WPS is not to make conflict more gender-equal, but to prevent conflict. The Strategic Approach and the EU Action Plan represent some progress in this regard, by aiming at an “improved understanding of the root causes of violence against women and girls and of gender-related drivers of conflict” (Council of the European Union, 2019, p.16). However, both documents fail to call for stronger international efforts to promo-
17 Operation Sophia (2015-2020) was an EU military mission aimed at ‘disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean’ (Tardy, 2015). It was often criticised as anti-migration, as it focused on smugglers instead of on rescuing migrants itself.

18 This interpretation draws on the work of Gayatri Spivak (and others) who in 1985 coined the phrase “white men saving brown women from brown men” to describe the British abolition of suttee in the nineteenth century.

2.2.2.2 Focus on Militarised Security Responses

This tendency of failing to capture the transformative spirit of WPS becomes more explicit when looking at the EU’s movement towards a “stronger security provider for its citizen” (European Commission, 2019), and the intensifying call for further defence cooperation and militarism, which have run in parallel to the EU’s increasing commitment to promoting gender equality (Haastrup, Wright and Guerri- na, 2019).

Since 2016, EU member states have worked to strengthen their cooperation within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), to become increasingly able to develop and use ‘hard military instruments’ in the name of security. The establishment of the European Defence Fund and the initiation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are probably the most prominent examples of this development (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019; Smith, 2019). This is also reflected in the new EU Global Strategy. While the European Security Strategy (2003), the predecessor of the EU Global Strategy aims for a secure Europe in a better world. The EU Global Strategy drops the ambition to work towards a better world, and only towards a stronger Europe (Davis, 2019). Indeed, the EU Global Strategy focuses on providing military security to protect its citizens from external threats, “particularly from terrorism … and from dangers emanating from Europe’s southern neighbourhood, and to support the ‘EU defence community’” (Ibid, p.9).

Less recognisable than the establishment of the European Defence Fund and PESCO are the ways “militarism permeates political and social relations, discourse and practices (…) at the EU” (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019, p.3). While the CSDP has always been highly militarised, scholars including Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff (2019, p.3) have witnessed an increasing “normalisation of militarism” over the last years – even as a response to humanitarian crises, such as the one on EU’s southern borders. In many of these cases, the EU justifies “militarism through gendered and racialised references” (Ibid, p.11): “The EU presents militarism as a response to migration not only as the most rational but also the most humane thing to do because it supposedly protects migrants, especially women and children” (…), omitting that these responses “go hand in hand with the suspension of EU norms and standards” (Ibid). Unsurprisingly, in promotional material for the CSDP Operation Sophia, but also the European Defence Fund and PESCO, women are largely presented as mothers and victims, who the EU is saving from ‘dangerous’ men of colour (Ibid, pp.11/12).

Despite the different views among EU member states of how close this cooperation within CSDP should be, scholars assume that we will see increasingly stronger cooperation, in particular after the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, which often

“Unsurprisingly, in promotional material for the CSDP Operation Sophia, but also the European Defence Fund and PESCO, women are largely presented as mothers and victims, who the EU is saving from ‘dangerous’ men of colour.”
The same gendered dynamics which link masculinity to traits such as strength, aggression, competitiveness, can e.g. be seen in the debate about (nuclear) disarmament: on the occasion of the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the United Nations General Assembly, then US Ambassador Nikki Haley argued that ‘as a mom, as a daughter, there’s nothing I want more for my family than a world without nuclear weapons. But we have to be realistic…you have to be asking yourself, are they [who are advocating for the ban treaty] looking out for their people?’ By contrasting her wish as a woman/mother for a nuclear free world with a realistic approach to security in which nuclear weapons are unfortunately necessary, she reinforces the gendered understanding of disarmament as feminine, weak and utopian while armament is realistic, strong and male (Reaching Critical Will, 2017).

It is important to acknowledge the gendered perception of the EU among its member states and scholars. In 2017, then President Juncker characterised PESCO as the ‘Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty’ (EU Commission, 2017). Enrique Mora Benevante, who was nominated by Josep Borrell to be Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs wrote in 2017: “It is time for the awakening kiss [of the EU/Sleeping Beauty]”, and “whether Europe will be able to make a difference in foreign policy depends on whether member states can fulfil PESCO’s commitments”, because the “problem is that she [the EU/Sleeping Beauty] awakes to a completely different world than she was designed for” (Be
navente, 2017). As Davis (2018, p.9) describes, it is unclear in this analogy “who assaults Sleeping Beauty, an unconscious and supremely passive being who has been bewitched/drugged to fall in love with her attacker on waking”. However, the image prevails of Europe/the EU “as a weak, passive, civilian, civilised (white) woman who wished to ‘do good’, waking up to the ‘needs’ of a man’s hard security world” (Ibid). This image devalues “specific traits that are associated with femininity” and reaffirms “that true power is rational, military and masculine” (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019, p.8).

Many actors – ranging from feminist civil society like the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom to UN Advisory Groups – have pointed out that the increasing focus of the EU on militarised approaches to security (like the UN and other international actors) not only falls short of addressing the structural causes of conflict and insecurity, including gender inequalities, but actively contributes to insecurity and instability, by normalising the use of force to address (perceived) threats (Kapur and Rees, 2019). This militarised approach also prevents the EU “from considering other causes of insecurity, such as the EU’s border policy or its own economic and monetary policies” (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019, p.7). As Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff (2019, p.10) point out, “Politico revealed that an internal EEAS report admits that the EU itself knew ‘that a number of its policies have made the sea crossing more dangerous for migrants’, for example because smugglers now use small and more dangerous rubber boats since the EU destroyed their wooden ones”. Additionally, militarism also reduces resources for other public investments at home and abroad, such as social security, healthcare and education (Meinzolt and Hjärtström, 2019), and civilian conflict prevention mechanisms. Organisations like the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) have raised their concerns regarding the ongoing debates about the Multiannual Financial Framework. Financial commitments to the European Peace Facility (see below), albeit an off-budget initiative, can have a negative impact on the member states’ support to the financial commitments to the Instrument for Peace and Stability (or whate
The authors would like to highlight that the debate around if/when military measures are necessary and legitimate to protect civilians, is a contested one, even among the feminist international relations community. This debate is however beyond the scope of this study. For this reason, the authors would only like to emphasise that a decision about military measures should always rest on the act of listening to marginalised voices (Aggestam et al., 2019), and those most impacted by the decision.

2.2.2.3 Focus on Militarism and Ties to The Defence Industry

The increased normalisation of a militarised approach to security is closely linked to the member states’ interest to support domestic defence companies, which generate profits, jobs, and tax revenues (Besch and Oppenheimer, 2019): ‘If the use of force is normalised as the measure of security and dispute resolution, the production and proliferation is necessary (Acheson and Butler, 2019).

Together, the EU’s member-states are second only to the US in the volume of the arms they export and accounted for almost 1/3 of all arms exports between 2014-2018, mainly to the Middle East (Wezeman et al., 2019). ENAAT has repeatedly drawn attention to the influence of the EU arms industries in Brussels, and the ‘pro-industry’ approach the EU Commission has been taking (ENAAT, 2020b). Increasingly, the EU Commission is relying on cooperation with major defence corporations and European weapons manufacturers to lobby EU member states that favour a more civilian role of the EU (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019).

The most recent example of successful lobbying seems to be the European Peace Facility (EPF), proposed by then High Representative Frederica Mogherini in 2017, which will replace the Athena Mechanism and the African Peace Facility, if agreed upon. Inter alia, the EPF will enable the training and equipment (including the provision of weaponry) of partner countries’ militaries, as well as regional and international organisations (Care International et al., 2019).

Peace organisations have strongly opposed this proposal, arguing that this type of military assistance “can harm peace and development and rarely provides its intended leverage. It often fails to address the underlying drivers of conflict and can instead be counterproductive, such as the violent repression of peaceful civil society actions, furthering the impunity of military forces, fomenting military-backed violence and conflict, and corruption. (...)” (Ibid). Other experts have pointed to the possibility of the recipient countries gaining harmful influence on political responses by the supplying countries and their partners, due to the financial dependency of the manufacturing industry of the supplying countries (Ryan, 2019). This can be seen in the case of the Yemen conflict and the influence of Saudi Arabia on the government of the United Kingdom (Merat, 2019).

As this section has shown, a variety of challenges needs to be overcome if the EU was to promote gender equality through and within its external action more substantially and sustainably. And adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. The next section outlines what a Feminist Foreign Policy of the EU could look like, and what principles and priorities need to be established to implement it.
Part 4

III

Moving Forward: A Feminist Foreign Policy for the EU
Despite the challenges and shortcomings of the EU to foster gender equality within and through its foreign policy, we believe that there is potential for the EU to move towards a Feminist Foreign Policy. The following section will propose an outline for an EU Feminist Foreign Policy including a clear definition, core principles, and concrete policy priorities. In doing so, this report follows the Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework, which was discussed under 1.2. This framework was developed by a group of approximately 15 leading thinkers and practitioners on Feminist Foreign Policy under the leadership of the International Centre for Research on Women. This includes government representatives responsible for their countries’ Feminist Foreign Policy in Sweden, Mexico, France, and Canada, representatives of think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations as well as civil society representatives leading on the topic, including the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy. The framework is also based on consultations with over 100 organisations, making this framework a state-of-the-art architecture for a concrete proposal for an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. As outlined above, the framework’s main elements are: 1) Purpose, 2) Definition, 3) Reach, 4) Intended Outcomes and Benchmarks to Achieve Over Time, and 5) Plan to Operationalise. All elements will be introduced, and the first three – Purpose, Definition, and Reach – will be applied to the EU context.

1. PURPOSE OF AN EU FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

In a first step, the ‘Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework’ requires the articulation of the ‘purpose of adopting a feminist foreign policy for your government’s specific context’. This purpose should be anchored ‘in the exercise and embrace of similar principles and priorities in domestic policies to ensure balance and coherence at home and abroad’ (Thompson, 2020a, p.4).

Pursuant to this, the authors of this study suggest following wording: The purpose of the EU to define, adopt, and implement a Feminist Foreign Policy is to contribute to a peaceful world, in which everyone regardless of their gender, age, ability, race, sexuality, and class has the same rights, opportunities, and resources. In line with long-standing feminist traditions, peace is defined in a comprehensive manner that includes social justice and the elimination of structural violence at all levels (Tickner, 2019). ‘Everyone’ explicitly includes all people living in non-EU countries. The differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between in- and outgroups (Hudson et al., 2014), is a patriarchal logic that a Feminist Foreign Policy strives to overcome.

In line with this, the authors of the study suggest a Feminist Foreign Policy for the EU to focus on the following foreign policy priorities based on the following principles:

---

21 The section draws heavily on Ridge et al. (2019), Meinzolt and Hjärnström (2019), and inputs from Dr. Louise Arimatsu
1.1 Priorities of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy

(1) Adapt and institutionalise an inclusive and comprehensive definition of gender

(2) Reverse the militarisation of the EU external action and prioritise human security

   a. End the export of arms manufactured in Europe and by companies registered in Europe

   b. Actively support efforts to international disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation

   c. Strengthen gender-sensitive civilian conflict prevention policies and tools

   d. Align the EU external action on security with the ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ Agenda

   e. Raise the EU’s ambition and capacities to mitigate the consequences of the climate crisis and to pursue climate justice as a guiding principle of the EU external action

(3) Actively pursue intersectional gender equality as a guiding principle of EU external action

(4) Enhance cooperation with and support to feminist civil society.

(5) Show political leadership towards implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy, enhance internal and institutional capacities to do so, and ensure institution-wide gender parity.

1.2 Principles of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy

(1) A Feminist Foreign Policy is a rights-based approach, ‘rooted in the universal principles of human rights and dignity’ (Ridge et al., 2019). It prioritises protecting and expanding human rights, in particular the rights of political minorities. This explicitly includes reproductive rights, including the right to legal and safe abortion.

(2) A Feminist Foreign Policy is based on an intersectional understanding of gender, which recognises and addresses intersecting discriminations based on gender, age, ability, race, sexuality, and class and acknowledges that gender is “a way of categorising, ordering, and symbolising power, of hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories of people, and different human activities symbolically associated with masculinities and femininities” (Cohen, 2013, p.3).

(3) A Feminist Foreign Policy is comprehensive and demands policy coherence across all fields of domestic and foreign policy.

(4) A Feminist Foreign Policy is inclusive of and accountable to those it impacts, at home and abroad.

“The purpose of the EU to define, adopt, and implement a Feminist Foreign Policy is to contribute to a peaceful world, in which everyone regardless of their gender, age, ability, race, sexuality, and class has the same rights, opportunities, and resources. ‘Everyone’ explicitly includes all people living in non-EU countries.”
A Feminist Foreign Policy is oriented towards cooperation instead of domination – in bilateral relations as well as in multilateral fora.

The authors strongly believe that adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy is in line with the Treaty on European Union’s Article 2, which outlines the values the Union is founded on: “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (European Union, 2016, Article 2). Furthermore, a Feminist Foreign Policy is very much in line with the identity of the EU as ‘normative power’, at whose heart is equality (Guerrina and Wright, 2016).

However, as discussed in II.2, the current strategy of the EU external action is, in the authors’ opinion, not in line with a Feminist Foreign Policy, as it, inter alia, primarily aims at making the EU more effective to promote and protect EU citizen’s, values and interests through a focus on hard security, to protect them “from terrorism [...] and from dangers emanating from Europe’s southern neighbourhood, and to support the ‘EU defence community’” (Davis, 2018, p. 9).

2. DEFINITION OF AN EU FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

In a second step, the ‘Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework’ suggests to “set out a definition of what feminist foreign policy means for your government: rationale, values, approach. Answer the question: How is this different from ‘business as usual’ foreign policy? Use an intersectional approach that analyses, names and seeks to address intersecting streams of marginalisation and power (e.g. gender, race/ethnicity, age, ability, etc.)”(Thompson, 2020a, p.4). Pursuant to this, the authors of the study suggest the following definition of an EU FFP, which draws both on the work of the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (the authors’ own organisation) and of the International Center for Research on Women (Thompson and Clement, 2019).

An EU Feminist Foreign Policy is the external action of the EU that defines its interactions vis-à-vis states, supranational organisations, multilateral forums, civil society, and movements in a manner that prioritises gender equality, enshrines the human rights of women and other politically marginalised groups and wholeheartedly pursues feminist peace. By offering an alternate and intersectional rethinking of security from the viewpoint of the most marginalised, it functions as a framework that elevates the everyday lived experience of marginalised communities to the forefront. A Feminist Foreign Policy scrutinises the destructive forces of patriarchy, capitalism, racism, and militarism across all of its levels of influence (e.g. humanitarian aid, trade, defence and diplomacy), and it allocates significant resources to achieve that vision.
A feminist approach to the EU external action provides a powerful lens through which we can interrogate the hierarchical global systems of power that have left millions of people in a perpetual state of vulnerability and is informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups, and movements. By doing so, it provides a broader and deeper analysis of global issues and represents the most promising approach to implement the EU’s core values as outlined in the EU Global Strategy.

3. REACH OF AN EU FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

In a third step, the ‘Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework’ requires to “name the scope of the policy: what agencies and efforts are impacted? Include all streams of foreign policy in one document with clear lines of reporting and coordination across agencies and divisions, e.g. defence, diplomacy, trade and foreign assistance (if applicable). Encouraging horizontal (not just vertical) approaches to integrating gender-responsive measures in policy and program efforts is an important element of wider efforts to advance gender equality and inclusion” (Thompson, 2020a, p.4).

In line with this and based on the above outlined principles of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, we have identified the following recommendations for each of the identified five priority areas. Pursuing these recommendations would set the EU on course to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy. Needless to say, this list is by far non-exclusive and should definitely be amended in an inclusive consultation process with feminist civil society from around the world.

3.1 Adapt and institutionalise an inclusive and comprehensive definition of gender

As outlined in II.2, the EU’s dominant understanding of gender is exclusive, fails to account for the rights and needs of LGBTQI+, and struggles to acknowledge intersecting discriminations as well as gender as a structural power relation. Moreover, II.2 has also shown that the EU mainly treats gender equality as an afterthought that can (only) be added to inherently gender-neutral policies to promote peace and security. This not only fails to acknowledge the gendered dimensions of violence, conflict, and instability, but also the unlikelihood of the EU’s efforts to promote peace and stability to be successful if they do not include a gender perspective.

As shown in II.2 this flawed and exclusive definition of gender and the failure to account for
the gendered dynamics of violence, conflict, and instability shape many EU policies, narratives, and initiatives, which in turn are incomprehensive and risk reinforcing existing inequalities. For the adoption of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy is it thus crucial for the EU to address these shortcomings at a discursive, strategic, and operational level. To do so, the EU should

- Adopt and institutionalise an intersectional definition of gender as a “socially constructed” structure, “based on perceived and real biological differences” (Confortini, 2012, p.7), and “a way of categorising, ordering, and symbolising power, of hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories of people, and different human activities symbolically associated with masculinities and femininities” (Cohen 2013, p.3). In short, gender is a system of power – as is colonialism, slavery, class, race, and caste (Ibid, p.4). An intersectional definition of gender acknowledges that these different systems of power can overlap, reinforce each other, and create additional forms of discriminations.

- Acknowledge that peace and security are highly gendered and not gender neutral and any policies that do not reflect this will most likely reproduce unequal gender power relations and such Do Harm, even if successful (Davis, 2018, p. 4).

3.2. Reverse the militarisation of EU external action and prioritise human security

As outlined in II.2., in parallel to the EU’s increasing commitment to promote gender equality, the EU member states have over the last year pushed for increased defence and militarism cooperation and strengthened the EU’s military capacity. This trend is not only reflected in the structural changes, such as the establishment of the European Defence Fund or the Permanent Structured Cooperation, but also in the discourses and practices at the EU. Scholars such as Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff (2019, p.3) describe an increasing “normalisation of militarism”, which leads to militarised security responses to humanitarian crises, such as the one the EU’s southern borders. This increasing focus on militarised security not only falls short of addressing the structural causes of insecurity, including gender inequality, but actually contributes violence, by inter alia, normalising the use of force to address (perceived) threats (Kapur and Rees, 2019). This increased normalisation of militarised security responses is closely linked to the member states interest to support domestic defence companies and the ‘pro-[defence] industry’ approach the EU Commission has been taking (ENAAT, 2020b).

From a feminist perspective, it is imperative that the EU ends the European arms exports, stops the influence of the arms industry in Brussels and advances international disarmament and arms control. Additionally, the EU should (politically and financially) strengthen gender-sensitive civilian conflict prevention and transformation and align its external actions with WPS. Lastly, the EU should actively address human security threats, above all the climate emergency and its consequences. To do so, the EU should:

a) End the export of arms manufactured in Europe and by companies registered in Europe

Together, the EU’s member states are second only to the US in the volume of arms exported and accounted for almost 1/3 of all arms exported between 2014-2018 (Wezeman et al., 2019). Currently, Brussels discusses the idea of a European Peace Facility, which, if agreed upon, will allow for the training and equipment (including the provision of weaponry) of partner countries’ militaries, as well as regional and international organisations. Organisations like ENAAT and Care International have criticised the arms exports and military for years, high-
lighting the detrimental consequences of arms exports – from furthering impunity of military forces, contributing to violent repression of civil society, gender-based violence, corruption and terrorism. A study by the Conflict Armament Research highlights that more than 30 percent of arms used by IS fighters in Syria and Iraq came from European states (Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).

For these reasons, the EU should:

- **Work towards a more effective and restricted Common Arms Export Policy**

  o Establish strict reporting deadlines and standardise the format of the report that member states have to submit to the Working Party on Conventional Arms Export, and support member states in building capacities to ensure adequate reporting, where necessary (Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).
  
  o Establish a sanctioning mechanism for non-compliance with the Common Arms Export Policy, and reporting requirements to the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports. Establishing a supervisory body that reports on non-compliance could be a first step towards establishing a sanctioning mechanism (Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).
  
  o The European Parliament should assess the reports on the implementation of the Common Arms Export Policy on an annual basis, as done in 2015 (ENAAT, 2020a).
  
  o Support and encourage member states to implement stronger post-shipment controls in partner countries. Experts, made up of Commission and/or EEAS staff, could be employed to help with controls in receiving countries (Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).
  
  o Encourage and support member and partner states to fully implement the Arms Trade Treaty’s requirement to take into account the risk of conventional arms covered in the Treaty to “commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children” (United Nations, 2014, p.6).
  
  o Invest substantial financial resources for independent monitoring and reporting on arms flows to support member states in developing a more unified position on the impact of international arms trade on stability and security (Ryan, 2019; Besch and Oppenheim, 2019).
  
  o Encourage and support member states in developing a European-wide strategy to reduce the economic dependency of national economies on the arms industry, with a clear goal of ending the production of arms exports in the medium-term.

- **End the influence of the arms industry on the European Commission and the European Parliament (’Kangaroo Group’).**

  o Short-term: Follow the recommendations of the European Ombudsman to ensure greater transparency by immediately publishing the agendas and meeting minutes of the Group of Personalities on Defence Research (Vranken, 2018).
  
  o Medium-term: Transform the Group of Personalities on Defence Research into a formal Expert Group on Human Security, which excludes representatives of the arms industry, and instead includes feminist civil society (based on Vranken, 2018).
  
  o Stop the European Peace Facility.

b) Actively support efforts to international disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation

In recent years, important international treaties, including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Arms Trade Treaty, have been revoked or no longer ratified by one or more State Parties. The EU is a crucial actor in shaping international cooperation on disarmament, arms
control, and non-proliferation, and the (in)ability to find a common position among member states can seriously impact the outcome of international negotiations on these questions (as seen at the 2015 NPT Review Conference). The lack of an EU common position is inter alia a consequence of the divergent standpoints on nuclear disarmament: In no other region, is the gap between the humanitarians and the self-proclaimed ‘realist’ so wide (Berghofer, 2016).

International disarmament and arms control is at the core of a Feminist Foreign Policy, because it rejects the paradigm ‘security through violence’ and ‘peace through war’ (Acheson, 2020). In line with feminist civil society activism over the last century, a Feminist Foreign Policy promotes human security. It calls for general and full international disarmament as well as a re-shift of resources from military budgets to budgets on civilian conflict prevention, education and health services; and the establishment of an international multilateral system in which power is not linked to military capacity. It continuously highlights the influence of the military-industrial complex, which essentially is profiting from violence and war, and the gendered consequences of all weapons.

For these reasons, the EU should actively support and advance efforts to international disarmament, arms control, and proliferation. To do so: The European Parliament should adopt a resolution ahead of the future NPT Review Conferences, recalling the need to ‘move toward a world without nuclear weapons’ and ‘the withdrawal of all tactical warheads in Europe could… set a precedent for further nuclear disarmament’ (European Parliament, 2010).

The European Parliament should adopt a resolution calling upon the member states to join the TPNW.

• The EU should encourage and support member states to find a common position ahead of the future NPT Review Conferences, which should include highlighting the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons.

• The EU, together with its NATO partners, should initiate a strategic and visionary process on the security in Europe which allows for alternatives to hosting US nuclear weapons on European territory as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy.

• The EU should endorse an international legally binding ban treaty of fully autonomous weapons, in line with the resolution passed by the European Parliament (2018), and support and encourage member states and partner states to also support such a ban.

c) Strengthen gender-sensitive civilian conflict prevention policies and tools

Over the last decade, the EU has developed a comprehensive set of policies and activities that enable non-military interventions to prevent violent conflict. Reversing the militarisation of EU security policies should go hand in hand with an expansion of EU’s of civilian conflict prevention capacities, to ensure that conflict prevention is mainstreamed throughout its external action (Davis, Habbida and Penfrat, 2017). Moreover, as shown in II.2, gender inequality and gendered norms as structural root causes of conflict are not being systematically accounted for in the formulation of the EU conflict prevention policy or recognised as important (Davis, 2018). Indeed, the Gothenburg Programme, which forms the basis of the EU’s conflict prevention work, is gender-blind (Ibid), and conflict prevention is often framed as gender-neutral. However, gender-blind conflict prevention and activities will most likely ‘Do Harm’, by reinforcing structural gendered inequalities and dominant gendered interests
To strengthen civilian gender-sensitive conflict prevention policies and tools, the EU should:

- **Enhance the EU's capacities on civilian conflict prevention, and ensure accountability**
  - Ensure conflict prevention is mainstreamed as a matter of policy and practice across the EU external action (the DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG DEVCO, DG Energy, DG Trade as well as the EEAS). This is particular holds true for the integration of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity into all EU activities (Davis, Habbida and Penfrat, 2017).
  - Further develop its capacities for preventive diplomacy by, for example, tailoring the support provided to EU Special Representatives and heads of delegations in charge of carrying out dialogue in conflict-affected countries and by including conflict expertise in their job descriptions (Ibid).
  - Appoint an EU Special Representative Peace, as suggested by the European Parliament (2019).
  - Establish, under the authority of the HR/VP, an EU high-level advisory board on conflict prevention and mediation, with the aim of setting up a comprehensive pool of experienced political mediators and conflict prevention experts (including feminist civil society) to make available political and technical expertise at short notice, as suggested by the European Parliament (2019).
  - The EEAS and the EU Commission should present an annual report to the European Parliament on the progress made in implementing EU policy commitments on conflict prevention and mediation, as outlined by the European Parliament (2019).
- **Ensure EU conflict prevention policies and activities are gender-sensitive**
  - Recognise gender inequality, the ‘construct of masculinities shaped and perpetuated by conflict, patriarchy, militarism and violence, the political economy of war and the impact of neo-liberalism’ as structural root causes of violent conflict and instability (Rees and Chinkin, 2016; Hudson, 2014).
  - Adopt a comprehensive conflict prevention approach that aims to transform gender relations; challenging, transforming, and eliminating violent militarised power relations and militarisation; ensuring sustainable equitable social and economic development, and promoting restorative justice (Kapur and Rees, 2019).
  - Place gender equality at the heart of any conflict prevention policy and practice (Davis, 2018).
  - Ensure that the WPS is fully integrated into the EU’s framework on conflict prevention and mediation.
  - Recognise that security and conflict are not gender-blind, and that gender-blind conflict prevention and mediation efforts will Do Harm, even when ‘successful’ (Davis, 2018).
- **Ensure adequate financial resources to civilian conflict prevention and mediation**
  - Transform the European Defence Fund into a Human Security Fund which funds multidisciplinary research on nonviolent conflict resolution alternatives (see: Kapur and Rees, 2019).
  - Keep the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) as recommended by the external evaluation in 2017. If the EU decides against the continuation or a change of the IcSp, it is vital that the activities which are currently supported through the IcSp continue to receive adequate funding (EPLO, 2018).
Ensure that conflict prevention and peacebuilding are included as specific objectives in the successors to IcSP.

- Make the meaningful involvement of civil society actors in the design and the implementation of all of its various policies and programmes a legal requirement (EPLO, 2018).
- Ensure the broadest possible range of civil society organisations, in particular feminist organisations are able to access long-term and flexible funding through all of the external financing instruments in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (based on Thijssen, S., Bossuyt, J., and Desmidt, S., 2019).

d) Align the EU external action with the ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ Agenda

As outlined in II.2, over the last 12 years, the EU has adopted a comprehensive framework on implementing the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda, which has become the dominant framework in which the EU addresses the gender in conflict, crisis management, and peacebuilding. However, the EU continues to struggle to translate this policy commitment into action, with many staff members lacking substantial knowledge on WPS and poor reporting. Moreover, similar to its approach to fostering gender equality, the EU sees WPS too often as an ‘added value’ to existing practices of security. The consequence of this approach is often an emphasis on fostering women’s participation in existing (military) structures, without addressing the structural causes of violent conflict, including violent power relations and militarisation. The Strategic Approach and the EU Action Plan represent important progress in this regard by aiming as they highlight the need to understand the gender-related drivers of conflict.

Thus, to fully and comprehensively implement the WPS Agenda, the EU need to align all of the external action with WPS. For this purpose, the EU should:

- Ensure that any future EU documents on the WPS Agenda reflect the transformative spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and its sister resolutions
- Ensure than women’s rights are not framed as resources for peace and security, but as a goal in and of themselves.
- Building on the Strategic Approach, acknowledge and address the structural root causes of conflict, including militarisation, violent power relations and gender stereotypes, such as destructive masculinities.
- Ensure that the rights, expertise, and needs of LGBTQI+ are fully and explicitly recognised.

- Build momentum among member states to implement the WPS Agenda
- Encourage and support the member states that have not yet done so to adopt National Action Plans on implementing the WPS Agenda.

- Ensure that the EU framework on the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ Agenda is being streamlined
- Ensure that the references to the EU’s framework on the WPS Agenda are streamlined across foreign policy strategies, all country strategies, mission mandates, policy strategies, and dialogues with partner countries, including local-level political dialogues and human rights dialogues.
The International Civil Society Action Network recently launched ‘She Builds Peace’, a collaborative campaign and global call to action to stand with women peacebuilders. This already reinforces structural discrimination of politically marginalised people and regions. As a ‘threat multiplier’, the climate emergency will exacerbate security threats to humans, societies, and states (Bremerberg, 2019). A Feminist Foreign Policy needs to address the climate emergency, as well as its consequences, wholeheartedly and needs to actively work towards climate justice.

- **Step up the EU and the EU member states’ action to limit the consequences of the climate emergency**
  - Revise The Green New Deal to include more ambitious goals (the goal to cut emission should be at least by 65 percent by 2030), more detail on how to achieve the objectives (such as protecting nature), and concrete suggestions on how to overcome the traditional economic growth paradigm towards an economic approach that respects planetary boundaries (Harvey et al., 2019).
  - Encourage and support member and partner states to fully implement the Paris Agreement (Bremerberg, 2019).

- **Raise awareness of the necessity to promote climate justice as a guiding principle in limiting and mitigating the consequences of the climate crisis**
  - Ensure that politically marginalised groups, in particular women from the Global South, are allowed and enabled to participate in national and international processes and negotiations on addressing the climate emergency, including the United Nations Climate Change Conferences.
  - Encourage and support partner states and international organisation to ensure comprehensive protection of women environmental activists.

- Enforce compliance with reporting on the implementation of the EU Action Plan on WPS by delegations and missions (Davis, 2018).
- Ensure close cooperation between the Informal Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security/Council Preparatory Body on Women, Peace and Security and the EEAS Directorate for Security and Conflict Prevention, as well as the geographic directorates, and the European Commission, to ensure better mainstreaming into EU external action (EPLO, 2012).
- **Ensure civil societies’ meaningful inclusion in the EU’s implementation of the WPS Agenda**
  - Establish and institutionalise a mechanism to regularly consult with women and representatives of other politically marginalised groups from diverse backgrounds in partner countries (as outlined in the EU Action Plan).
  - Until the Informal Taskforce has been transformed into a Council Preparatory Body on Women, Peace and Security, ensure that civil society is invited to participate in the meetings of the Informal Taskforce at all levels (technical and political).
  - Ensure that women peacebuilders are strategically and consistently (politically and financially) supported and protected.\(^{32}\)

-e) **Raise the EU’s ambition and capacities to mitigate the consequences of the climate crisis and to pursue climate justice as a guiding principle of the EU external action**

The climate emergency is already impacting the (human) security of people across the world, and in particular that of women in the Global South.
• Enhance the EU’s capacities to address ‘risks and threats to humans, societies, and states that emanate from the adverse effects of climate change’ (Bremberg, 2019, p.2).
  
  o Ensure that these threats are addressed by the EEAS climate diplomacy.
  o Ensure climate variables are included in all early warnings, as well as conflict and/or context analyses.
  o Ensure that EU Special Representatives, EU delegations and missions are mandated to analyse and address the risks and threats to humans, societies, and states that emanate from the adverse effects of climate change and report on their work in this regard.

• Ensure adequate financial resources to mitigate and address the consequences of the climate emergency.
  
  o Ensure that climate justice will be recognised and implemented as a horizontal principle in all coming Multiannual Financial Frameworks.
  o Ensure that within all future Multiannual Financial Frameworks, substantial amounts are earmarked for the mitigation of the consequences of the climate emergency by including a specific budget line on climate justice, which includes financial support to feminist civil society organisations that work to strengthen local resilience and to mitigate and manage these consequences (within the NDICI or other models).

3.3. Actively pursue intersectional gender equality as a guiding principle of the EU external action

As outlined in 2.2.1, the EU’s approach to promoting gender equality usually follows an instrumental and neoliberal logic, which favours gender equality for the benefit of more effective security (or economic growth or development) instead of as a goal itself. This approach often leads to less political and financial resources being used to promote gender equality, than if gender equality was considered a goal in itself. The focus is on adding/including women into existing structures and without transforming these existing structures and policies so that they contribute to equal societies. This makes emancipation and individual tasks and ignores the structural causes of marginalisation of political minorities, and the responsibilities of states and institution to address this structural inequality. Gender equality can only be achieved if it is pursued as a stand-alone objective and implemented as a guiding principle across all external actions, instead of being considered a means to achieve other objective and/or an add-on to existing strategies. To pursue intersectional gender equality as a guiding principle of the EU external action, the EU should:

• Guarantee that all EU external action contributes to gender equality
  
  o Ensure that gender equality is pursued as a stand-alone objective in all country strategies, mission mandates, policy strategies, and dialogues with partner countries, including local-level political dialogues and human rights dialogues, while being pursued for its own sake (in line with the Strategic Approach).
  o Ensure that all strategies, mission mandates, and policy strategies are based on data, which is disaggregated by gender, age, disability, race, and class (Ridge et al., 2019).
  o Ensure that gender-sensitive conflict and/or context analysis is mandatory for all EU external action (EPLO, 2018) (as e.g. outlined in the Framework for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (through external relations 2016-2020) (EU Commission, 2015).

• Ensure support from member states for
Amnesty International analyses in its reports the implementation of the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and makes clear recommendation to ensure the consistent and strategic implementation of the Guidelines. These recommendations are also valid for the protection of women rights defenders.

- **Prioritise protecting and advancing women’s participation in all political and economic processes.**
  - Support and encourage those member states which have not done so to ratify the Istanbul Convention and promote EU ratification of the Convention (based on Government Office of Sweden, 2019).
  - Ensure support to those member states which publicly counter the international push-back against the rights of political minorities and gender equality.

- **Prioritise protecting and advancing the rights of women and LGBTQI+ people**
  - Encourage and support partner and member states to adopt 50 percent quotas for women’s participation in local and national elections and company boards.
  - Ensure that women and LGBTQI+ rights defenders receive strategic and consistent support (based on Amnesty International, 2019). This includes the EU Council on Foreign Relations regularly assessing the situation of women and LGBTQI+ rights defenders, both globally and in specific situations, as well as the development of country strategies to support women and LGBTQI+ human rights defenders (based on Amnesty International, 2019).23
  - Encourage and support partner states and international organisation to ensure comprehensive protection of women journalists (based on Government Office of Sweden, 2019).

- **Prioritise protecting and advancing sexual and reproductive rights and health of women and LGBTQI+**
  - Ensure that the HR/VP and relevant Commissioners regularly express their concern on the increasing populist backlash on women’s and LGBTQI+’s sexual and reproductive health and rights within and outside of the EU, and publicly announce support to member and partner states in their efforts to counter this backlash (Centre for Reproductive Rights, 2019).
  - Ensure that all their external actions – including development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and efforts to promote human rights, the rule of law, and democracy – prioritise the protection and advancement of sexual and reproductive health and rights, including access to contraception, safe abortion care, and post-abortion services. The protection and advancement of reproductive rights and health should become a priority in the human rights dialogues.
  - Commission an independent evaluation of the EU external action on strengthening reproductive health and rights (Thijssen, Bossuyt and Desmidt, 2019).
  - Establish an early-warning mechanism to monitor legislative proposals and other state actions that limit the ability of civil society working on gender equality, and sexual and reproductive health, and the rights to operate freely, in the EU and beyond (Centre for Reproductive Health and Rights, 2019).

23 Amnesty International analyses in its reports the implementation of the European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and makes clear recommendation to ensure the consistent and strategic implementation of the Guidelines. These recommendations are also valid for the protection of women rights defenders.
Rights, 2019).

- Encourage and support member states and partner countries to regularly collect data on and monitor the provision of sexual and reproductive health services and rights to women and LGBTQI+ people in their jurisdiction, including undocumented migrant and refugee communities, members of ethnic minority groups, and survivors of sexualised violence (Centre for Reproductive Rights, 2019).

- Ensure that the EU’s position that ‘international humanitarian law and/or international human rights law may justify offering a safe abortion’, as outlined in the Letter from Federica Mogherini and Christos Stylianides, members of the previous Commission, to Members of the European Parliament concerning female victims of war rape (ref. Ares(2015)3757306), is turned into practice. This includes transcribing this policy into the package of documents used to guide EU-funded humanitarian NGOs (including contracts, memoranda of understanding) and pro-actively informing its grantees about this policy in writing, and verifying that this policy is being implemented (Global Justice Center, 2019).

- Ensure that all future Multiannual Financial Frameworks include a specific budget line for sexual and reproductive health and rights, including financial support to feminist civil society organisations that work to protect and advance reproductive rights of women and LGBTQI+ people (within the NDICI or other models) (Thijssen, Bossuyt and Desmidt, 2019).

- Improve the EU’s internal tracking of funds spent on protecting and advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights (Thijssen, Bossuyt and Desmidt, 2019).

- Prioritise preventing men’s physical, psychological, and sexualised violence against women and LGBTQI+.

- Encourage and support partner states to criminalise intimate partner violence (‘domestic violence’), including marital rape.

- Raise awareness of the links between destructive masculinity norms and violence against women and girls and work to counteract these (based on Government Office of Sweden, 2019).

- Encourage all partner states to change legislation towards recognising ‘femicides’.

- Ensure adequate financial resources to pursue gender equality as a guiding principle.

- Ensure that gender budgeting will be recognised and implemented as a horizontal principle in all coming Multiannual Financial Frameworks.

- Ensure that within all future Multiannual Financial Frameworks substantial amounts are earmarked for gender equality by including a specific budget on gender equality, which includes financial support to feminist civil society organisations that work to protect and advance the rights of political minorities (within the NDICI or other models).

3.4 Enhance Cooperation with and support to feminist civil society

Feminist civil society and feminist networks are crucial for the promotion of a feminist agenda, for the production and diffusion of norms, to support feminists within the institutions as well as to hold institutions accountable (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). For over a century now, feminist international civil society have advocated for demilitarisation, arms control, and human security. International civil society has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the WPS Agenda. For these reasons, it is important for the EU to acknowledge the expertise of civil society, to strengthen and (financially and politically) support and to cooperate with civil society organisations, without outsourcing
the responsibility for human rights and social justice to these actors (Muehlenhoff, 2017). The EU member states, as well as inter- and intra-national organisations like the EU institutions, remain the ultimate duty-bearer to protect and advance human rights and social justice (Ridge et al., 2019).

To enhance cooperation with and support to feminist civil society, the EU should

- Continue to fund and work with the Civil Society Dialogue Network.
- Accompany the Civil Society Dialogue Network by establishing small and informal advisory groups consisting of femocrats (individuals positioned within the EEAS, the Council preparatory bodies, and the EU Commission, who are motivated to move towards transformative change in line with feminist values), feminist civil society organisations, and epistemic communities (professional experts with recognised expertise in a particular foreign policy area) that advise the EEAS and the EU Commission on all matters of foreign policy (Guerrina and Wright, 2016; based on Woodward, 2003).
- Encourage (through political and flexible, long-term financial support) annual evaluation of the EU external action by feminist civil society from within the EU member states and in partner countries.
- Allow non-EU citizens in partner countries who are impacted by EU external action, to lodge a complaint with the European Ombudsman.
- Ensure that civil society organisations, including loosely coordinated movements, in particular those operating in hostile environments, are being provided flexible financial support with low administrative burdens (based on Thijssen, Bossuyt and Desmidt, 2019), building on key objectives outlined in the Strategic Approach (Council of the EU, 2018, p.20).
- Organise regular Feminist Foreign Policy consultation with feminist civil society from within EU member and partner states.

3.5 Show political leadership towards implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy, enhance institutional capacities to do so, and ensure institution-wide gender parity

As the introduction of a Feminist Foreign Policy in Sweden has demonstrated, political leadership at the highest level as well as ownership across all policy levels is crucial to achieve institutional and policy change in line with feminist values. This includes strengthening institutional capacities and valuing people’s expertise to promote a Feminist Foreign Policy. Moreover, identifying clear and transparent policy objectives, benchmarks, and timeframes is a crucial aspect of a Feminist Foreign Policy as it allows civil society and those impacted by EU polices to hold the EU institutions accountable (based on Ridge et al., 2019).

Additionally, implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy must be based on the equal and fair distribution of power in all institutions and across all levels to ensure equal representation of all people’s needs, lived experiences, and perspectives. In the case of the EEAS (and other EU entities), this will require significant work as the gender-balance in senior management positions within EEAS is currently so far off, that ‘[w]ith the current trends, it could take 23 years to achieve gender balance in AD positions and 56 years to achieve gender balance in management in the EEAS’ (EEAS, 2017).

To demonstrate political leadership, to enhance institutional capacities, and to ensure institution-wide gender parity, the EU should:

- Ensure political leadership and institutional-wide ownership
  - Ensure that senior policymakers within the European Commission and the EEAS, including the EU Commissioners and the HR/VP...
as well as EU ambassadors in partner countries regularly and publicly reiterate their commitment to a Feminist Foreign Policy and clearly communicate this to their staff members in Brussels, delegations, missions, and partners at the bilateral, international, and multinational level.

- Strengthen the work towards a significant institutional culture shift by inter alia securing dedicated ownership for gender equality [and Feminist Foreign Policy] at all levels and across Commission services and within the EEAS, at headquarters as well as at the level of EU Delegations, EUSRs and CSDP missions and operations, through guidelines, awareness campaigns and trainings on gender equality [and Feminist Foreign Policy], and by ensuring a safe working environment, free of gender-based violence and harassment’. (Sweden and France, 2019).

- Develop a Plan to Operationalise its Feminist Foreign Policy (EU Feminist Foreign Policy Action Plan with clear objectives, priorities, and milestones). Ensure that staff members are consulted in the drafting process of the Action Plan and know how to implement it.

- Ensure comprehensive, regular, and transparent reporting by EU Delegations and CSDP mission on the progress of implementing the EU Feminist Foreign Policy Action Plan.

**Strengthen internal and institutional capacities to implement a Feminist Foreign Policy**

- Establish an Internal Taskforce for Feminist Foreign Policy comprised of representatives of the EU Commission, the EU Council, the European Parliament and the EEAS, headed by a Feminist Foreign Policy Coordinator (to be established at the level of a Deputy Secretary General) and responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the EU Feminist Foreign Policy (based on Bigio and Vogelsetin (2020)’s recommendation of a High Council on Gender Equality). The Internal Taskforce for Feminist Foreign Policy should continuously consult with the soon-to-be-established (civil society) Global Taskforce for Feminist Foreign Policy.

- Establish Feminist Foreign Policy Focal Points (below Director level) in all missions, delegations, and EEAS departments (based on the Swedish best practice) that are being line-managed by the Feminist Foreign Policy Coordinator.

- For example: A Feminist Foreign Policy Focal Point within the sections for ‘Security and Defence policy’, ‘Partnerships and Agreements’, ‘Counter Terrorism’, as well as ‘Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control’ (within the sub-department of ‘Security and Defense Policy’ under the Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and crisis response) would ensure that all strategies would be gender-sensitive, including the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy.

- Transform the current position of the EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender and the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 into a Principal Advisory on Feminist Foreign Policy, with substantial more financial and human resources.

- Establish the position of an EU Special Representative for Feminist Foreign Policy (with direct line of communication to HR/VP). All three positions (Feminist Foreign Policy Coordinator (Deputy Secretary General level), Feminist Foreign Policy Advisor, and an EU Special Representative on Feminist Foreign Policy work closely together.

- Establish the position of a Commissioner on Civil Society and Gender Equality.

- Introduce expertise on gender equality and Feminist Foreign Policy and a proven track record of initiatives promoting gender equality and a feminist approach to foreign policy as a mandatory criterion in job offers and descriptions, as well as performance reviews and pro-
motion requirements.

- Develop routines and tools for hands-on integration of a gender perspective in analyses planning, budgeting and every day work, inter alia by using sex and age disaggregated data throughout the system and all policy areas, including CSDP and WPS, trade, human rights, climate action, development assistance, humanitarian aid, health, enlargement etc. (Sweden and France, 2019).

- Conduct an institution-wide assessment of the knowledge on the interlinkages between gender and conflict, and gender equality, among staff members within the EEAS, the European Commission, the EU missions, and delegations. Based on the outcome of this assessment, develop a comprehensive institution-wide strategy on how to substantially increase knowledge on gender and conflict, and gender equality ‘to ensure that all personnel have the technical expertise needed to implement gender equality policies’ (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2020).

  ‘All personnel in domestic and foreign policy departments should receive in-person training on gender-based analysis and implicit bias as part of their onboarding process.’ (Ibid). Ensure that participation in any activities outlined in the strategy are mandatory for every staff member working in the EU Commission, the EEAS, delegations and missions.

- Ensure institutional-wide gender parity

  - Adopt a negative quota of 50 percent to prevent over-representation of any gender/group of society for all levels in the EU Commission, the EEAS, EU delegations and CSDP missions.
  
  - Implement the proposed recommendations by SIPRI (Smit, 2019), and Women in International Security (WIIS) Belgium (2017) with regard to the CSDP.

4. INTENDED OUTCOMES AND BENCHMARKS TO ACHIEVE OVER TIME

In a fourth step, the ‘Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework’ requires to “clearly state what outcomes your policy seeks to advance and specify the timelines for change. Outcome targets, developed in consultation with the people they are intended to help, can be impactful on some issues, as can outlining “stretch” goals that challenge governments to increase resources/level of effort, and to prioritize the issues that are perceived as most consequential (e.g. climate, sexual and reproductive health and rights) in a context-specific way.” (Thompson, 2020a, p.5). Defining the intended outcomes, benchmarks, and timelines in line with the identified Purpose, Definition, and Reach of the Feminist Foreign Policy would be the next step for the EU on its way to adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy. This is crucial because at its core, feminist foreign policy should be about achieving change over time to advance particular outcomes. Being mindful of the scope of this study, we will not elaborate further on this step of the Framework. For future reference, we are including two tables from the Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework, which are very useful resources to define measures of success (Annex 1) as well as outcome and accountability measures (Annex 2).

5. PLAN TO OPERATIONALISE

In a fifth and final step, the ‘Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework’ requires defining ‘how and when the policy is going to be implemented and provide an action plan with specific activities and the period of implementation.’ (Thompson 2020a, p.5). Articulating – in line with the identified Purpose, Definition, Reach and Intended Outcomes and Benchmarks – how and when an EU Feminist Foreign Policy will be implemented, would
be the fifth and final step for the EU on its way to adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy. This includes providing an action plan (i.e. an EU Feminist Foreign Policy Action Plan) outlining specific activities and timeline. The action plan should clearly articulate which resources will be necessary, and how policies are being developed, implemented, and evaluated. Lastly, the action plan should also include clear reporting schedule and a plan to enhance internal and institutional capacities to implement a Feminist Foreign Policy.

Being mindful of the scope of this study, we will not elaborate further on this step of the Framework. For future reference, we are listing below additional information from the Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework, that should be considered when articulating such action plan. It is important to highlight that the action plan must be formulated in consultations with feminist civil society, in the EU and in partner countries.

a) **Resources:** Which resources (staffing, financial and research, for instance), will be required to achieve the goals that have been articulated? This should include stretch goals for increased staffing and budgetary support.

b) **Representation and inclusion:** Several countries point to the numbers of women in leadership in their foreign policy as a measure of feminist foreign policy. This is a necessary component, which should be considered at all levels of staffing. It should not be limited to a unique focus on women but also considerations related to diversity relevant for the context such as race, ability, ethnicity, religion, language, sexual orientation gender identity and expression, age and other forms of identity. We recommend setting additional benchmarks here, such as gender parity and racial diversity in senior positions, increased numbers of gender advisors, gender equality training for all staff, including managers, and sustained efforts to promote diversity in human resources management and recruitment, mentoring and professional development. Importantly, this component is not just about women in government positions, but representation of feminist civil society throughout the policymaking process—the “how” of how policy is developed, implemented and evaluated, in a feminist process of two-way, meaningful conversation, not just consultation.

c) **Reporting Schedule:** According to the principle of transparency, government should report on the implementation of policy to the public at regular (annual) intervals. In addition to self-reporting, adopt systems of external and third-party research and evaluation to validate and interrogate results. Reports should be made publicly available in many languages to encourage learning within and beyond government. Where principles or goals of the policy are compromised, naming those tensions is good practice as a statement of limitations and lessons learned.

d) **Capacity Building:** Feminist approaches and perspectives are generally not part of the usual training of diplomats, security experts, and trade negotiators. Operationalisation plans should include how new analytical approaches will be strengthened and incorporated into daily operations.
Part 4

IV

Conclusion
Conclusion

Through analysing EU existing commitments to foster gender equality within its external action and by providing concrete policy recommendations aimed at encouraging a radical shift of the EU external action towards an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, this study aims to start a discussion about a Feminist Foreign Policy for the EU. With an increasing number of states within and outside the EU adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy and/or prioritising gender equality within its foreign policies, the new EU Commission promising to champion gender equality, the need to find different responses to growing global inequalities, and the growing push-back against women’s rights across the globe, it is the appropriate timing for such a discussion. Additionally, the current COVID-19 pandemic strongly shows the need for gendered and feminist policies if existing inequalities are not to be exacerbated but reduced.

By providing a vision for a more just and equal world and by linking the individual and collective emancipation to societal transformation, including the redistribution of power and resources, an EU external action based on the values of intersectional feminism provides the most promising approach to achieving the EU’s declared goal of contributing to international peace.

Over the last decade, the EU has developed a variety of initiatives, policies, and strategies within its external action that either incorporate (to a certain extent) a gender perspective or that actively aim at fostering gender equality. The Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security is the most prominent example of the EU’s efforts to promote gender equality within and through its external action. Additionally, the EU Global Strategy (2016), commits to ‘systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions’ (EEAS, 2016, p.11). These can certainly serve as a starting point for a Feminist Foreign Policy, but many (big) challenges remain, as adopting a Feminist Foreign Policy requires a radical shift towards how foreign policy is being conducted, how it is talked about, and who is making the decisions.

This study discusses some of these challenges: The absence of a comprehensive understanding of gender which accounts for the needs and perspective of gender non-confirming people and sexual minorities and recognises gender as a structural power relation. The tendency to see gender equality as a means to achieve other ends, such as more effective security or development, instead of pursuing it as a stand-alone goal. The failure to systematically account for gender inequality and the gendered norms as a structural root causes of violence and conflict. These issues partly explain why gender has been left ‘on the margins of the EU external action’ (Chappell and Guerrina, 2020, p.2), with the exception of specific recommendations in
the WPS framework. Consequently, many EU policies remain either gender-blind (such as the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy or the EU Policies on Conflict Prevention), or inadequately gender-sensitive (such as the European Commission’s Communication on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism). Moreover, those policies that aim at promoting gender equality and that (for some extent) account for gendered dimensions of violence and conflict (such as the Strategic Framework on Women, Peace and Security) remain, to a large extent, siloed.

The biggest challenge on the road to an EU Feminist Foreign Policy is however the growing EU members’ interest to further defence and militarism cooperation and to strengthen the EU’s military capacity. This trend is not only reflected in structural changes (such as the establishment of the European Defence Fund), but also in the discourses and practices at the EU. This increasing ‘normalisation of militarism’ (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019) leads to militarised security responses to humanitarian crisis, such as the one the EU’s southern borders. This approach not only falls short of addressing the structural causes of insecurity, including gender inequality, but actually contributes violence, by inter alia, normalising the use of force to address (perceived) threats (Kapur and Rees, 2019).

The study proposes a potential design of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy, applying the Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework (Thompson 2020a), a comprehensive framework developed over the course of 2019 by leading thinkers in the field of Feminist Foreign Policy. In addition to providing a concrete definition of an EU Feminist Foreign Policy and defining its underlying principles, the study suggests the EU to pursue following policy priorities. Implementing these recommendations would set the EU on course to adopt a Feminist Foreign Policy (Part III of the study elaborates on these recommendations in detail, outlining concrete steps to achieve each of them).

(1) Adapt and institutionalise an inclusive and comprehensive definition of gender that accounts for the needs and perspective of gender-non confirming people and sexual minorities and accepts gender as a system of power. Acknowledge that peace and security are highly gendered and that any policies that do not reflect this will most likely reproduce unequal power relations and such Do Harm, even if successful (Davis, 2018, p. 4).

(2) Reverse the militarisation of the EU external action and prioritise human security. This includes ending the exports of arms produced in Europe or by European companies; stopping the influence of the defence industry in Brussels; advancing international disarmament and arms control; strengthening gender-sensitive civilian conflict prevention; aligning its external action with the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda, and actively addressing human security threats, above all the climate emergency and its consequences.

(3) Actively pursue intersectional gender equality as a guiding principle of the EU external action.

(4) Enhance cooperation with and support to feminist civil society.

(5) Show political leadership towards implementing a Feminist Foreign Policy, enhance internal and institutional capacities to do so, and ensure institution-wide gender parity.

As stated in the beginning, the study aims at contributing to a discussion about an EU Feminist Foreign Policy. Continuing this discussion, in particular with feminist civil society in those countries and regions that are (positively and negatively) impacted by the EU external action, is of utmost importance.
Part 5

V

Annex
Annex 1: Measures of Success (Thompson, 2020a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal and Process Measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>• Internal policies and protections to advance gender equality (e.g. paid leave, mechanism to prevent sexualised and gender-based violence and discrimination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Percent increase investment in domestic and foreign affairs budgets/staffing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Flexible funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Gender Budgeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>• Number of minority ministers, deputies, ambassadors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Percent increase in gender advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parity at all staff levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inclusion of feminist civil society in the process of policymaking, implementation, evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Reporting</td>
<td>• Monitoring and evaluation for the impact and uptake of internal policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rigorous and independent impact evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reach</td>
<td>• Horizontal integration of gender-responsive measures by applying a gender lens to all policies and programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coherence across aid, trade, defence, diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Outcome Measures</td>
<td>Accountability Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Improvement of LGBTQI+, women’s, indigenous/minority, disability, youth/aging rights standards at global, regional, national, and state levels.  
  • Advancement of rights most under attack (sexual and reproductive health and rights including LGBTQI+ and safe abortion; environmental and climate commitments)  
  • Explicit support for women’s human rights and LGBTQI+ rights defenders Protection of and support for women peacebuilders | Gender equality specific:  
  • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
  • Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action  
  • UNSCR 1325  
  • Regional agreements (Maputo Protocol, Istanbul Convention, etc.)  
  
General:  
  • 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development/SDGs  
  • Universal Declaration on Human Rights  
  • Human Rights Council (incl. Special 6 Procedures, Gender Office)  
  • Trade dispute mechanisms |
| • Increasing support for feminist organisations  
  • Increasing control of funds by feminist funders | OECD DAC gender marker  
  • External validation for all self-reported metrics  
  • Training on applying a gender equality approach to international policies and programs |
| • Co-creation of feminist policies, programs with civil society  
  • Increased numbers of minorities in social, economic and political leadership roles | Quotas (at home and abroad)  
  • Parity pledges  
  • Implementation of the GAPS UK consultation process |
| • Investments and policy decisions are rooted in rigorous evidence across all streams of FFP | Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound or “SMART” indicators  
  • Public, independent and outcomes-based reporting on impact of FFP annually  
  • Use of feminist evaluation techniques |
| • Mirror priorities in domestic and foreign policies  
  • Embrace of intersectionality in focus areas and approach | Clear definition of FFP  
  • Stated SMART goals for the policy  
  • Benchmarks over time |
Part 6
VI
Bibliography


We are tremendously grateful for the support we have received from many individuals and organisations while writing this report. We would like to thank Anna Penfrat, Ben Moore, Christina Bache, Colin Cogitore, Grant Shubin, Hanna Muehlenhoff, Isabelle Arradon, Julia Brilling, Karen Höhn, Katharina Wright, Katrine Thomasen, Laetitia Séoudou, Laura Davis, Louise Arimatsu, Madeleine Rees, Margot Jones, Olivia Caeymaex, Roberta Guerrina, Sonya Reines-Djivanides, and Virginija Langbakk for their inputs, support, and information.